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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to provide an insight into the scope and impact of potential pre- and post-
investment problems between angel investors and entrepreneurs. In this introductory chapter I will first 
describe the angel financing market, to then provide an overview of the literature in terms of its current 
status and gaps. Hereafter I will also provide a broad overview of the topics covered by the three papers in 
this dissertation to then end with a summary of these same papers. 
 
1.1 Setting the landscape: Angel financing 
 
Google, Amazon.com, Skype, Twitter, the Body Shop and Starbucks…all famous examples of companies 
that received financing from so-called angel investors or business angels. These investors are individuals 
who invest some of their own wealth in unlisted companies in exchange for shares and who have no 
family or friend connection to the entrepreneur (Mason, 2006). The importance of angel investors as a 
financing source for entrepreneurial companies cannot be underestimated. Small and/or young, high-
growth companies generally face substantial difficulties in raising financing from more traditional sources 
such as banks and public capital markets due to a lack of track record, profit generation and tangible 
assets, all of which result in high uncertainty for potential investors (Berger and Udell, 1998; Da Rin et al., 
2006). After having depleted their own resources, as well as those of family and friends, entrepreneurs 
need to turn to external sources of private financing, i.e. angel investors or venture capitalists (Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Denis, 2004; Ueda, 2004). As venture capitalists have started to shift their attention towards 
larger and older investments, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain those crucially needed funds 
for young companies or ventures that only need small amounts of financing (European Commission, 2003; 
Mason and Harrison, 2003). As such, there is a huge gap for angel investors to fill up between, on the one 
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hand, whatever maximum amount entrepreneurs can secure from their family and friends and, on the other 
hand, the minimum amount venture capitalists are willing to invest. In the USA, for instance, this gap is 
estimated to range between $ US 100 000 and $ US 5.0 million (Freear et al., 2002; Sohl, 2003). To 
further highlight the importance of angel financing, consider the following numbers: allegedly 258 200 
U.S. angel investors invested $ US 26.0 billion in 57 120 companies in 2007, compared to venture 
capitalists investing $ US 29.4 billion in 3 813 companies (Sohl, 2007; PWC et al., 2007). Moreover, 
about 39% of all US angel investments were made at the seed and start-up stages of a company, while this 
is merely 11% of all US venture capital investments in 2007 (Sohl, 2007; PWC et al., 2007). Angel 
investors thus clearly represent the largest source of seed and start-up capital for entrepreneurial 
companies. In Europe, relatively few data on angel investments are available. Mason (2006) estimates that 
20 000 to 40 000 UK angels yearly invest £ 0.5 billion to £ 1.0 billion in 3 000 to 6 000 companies, 
backing eight times more start-ups than venture capitalists. According to more recent estimates, Europe as 
a whole should count about 75 000 business angels, investing around 3.0 billion EUR yearly (EBAN, 
2008). 
 
1.2 State of the angel financing literature 
 
Despite the importance of angel investors in the financing process of small and young companies, angel 
financing is still a relatively underresearched area and the research that does exist has not yet quite 
outgrown its “Cinderella status” (Mason, 2006, p. 3) due to a plethora of studies ungrounded in theory. 
What we do know about angel investors is generally limited to descriptive facts and figures. For instance, 
a typical angel investor is a middle-aged man, has managerial and/or entrepreneurial experience and 
invests in entrepreneurial companies for a variety of reasons, among which financial returns, personal 
satisfaction, opportunities to influence the development of a new venture and job creation (Prowse, 1998; 
Mason, 2006). This also makes them rather patient investors with a general anticipated time-to-exit 
between 5 and 7 years, with roughly half of those exits resulting in a loss or break-even and about one 
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quarter resulting in a rate of return of 50% or more (Freear et al., 2002; Mason and Harrison, 2002a). Post-
investment, angel investors can take on many roles in their portfolio companies with varying degrees of 
active participation (Prowse, 1998).  
 
What is lacking from this literature overview though is a clear insight into the relationship and interaction 
between angel investors and entrepreneurs. More specifically, it has been widely documented that 
entrepreneurs and angel investors are often confronted with pre- and post-investment problems. Pre-
investment, both parties face substantial information problems (Sohl, 1999). Post-investment, cooperation 
between external investors and entrepreneurs is crucial to the portfolio company‟s success (Cable and 
Shane, 1997; Wijbenga and van Witteloostuijn, 2006). Despite this, previous research has indicated that 
this relationship is rather prone to conflict instead and, as such, cooperation is far from self-evident 
(Higashide and Birley, 2002; Parhankangas and Landström, 2006; Yitshaki, 2008). Therefore, the goal of 
this dissertation is to provide an insight into the scope and impact of these pre- and post-investment issues 
between angel investors and entrepreneurs. Whereas the first paper of this dissertation is focused on the 
pre-investment relationship, the second and third papers focus on the post-investment relationship. Next, 
in the overview of the topics covered in all three papers, the relevant literature will be discussed further. 
 
1.3 Pre-investment problems between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
 
In the entrepreneurial finance literature it is often argued that entrepreneurial companies suffer from 
information asymmetries due to a lack of track record, profit generation and collateralisable assets (Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Da Rin et al., 2006). This impedes them from reliably conveying their value to potential 
investors, resulting in financing difficulties. Further, the angel financing market as a whole is also 
frequently hypothesized to suffer from a lack of transparency, resulting in angel investors and 
entrepreneurs having considerable difficulties in finding each other. Entrepreneurs are not always fully 
informed about the array of possible financing sources and their characteristics (Van Auken, 2001). 
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Furthermore, even if they understand angel financing, they are not always able to locate angel investors, as 
these often do not want to make their investment intentions public. In the same vein, angel investors often 
have trouble in locating valuable investment opportunities (Mason and Harrison, 2002b). Together, these 
difficulties afflicting the angel financing market constitute pre-investment information problems and are 
often considered as a source of market failure. In order to help reduce these information and resulting 
financing problems of entrepreneurial companies, many measures have been implemented such as the 
creation of business angel networks, tax incentives, improved legislation, education of angel investors and 
entrepreneurs or co-investment schemes. One could argue that of these measures the creation of business 
angel networks is the most vital one as all other measures cannot work effectively without first reducing 
search problems, which is exactly what business angel networks aim to do (Mason, 2006). More 
specifically, these networks were created to enhance the transparency of the angel financing market by 
providing a communication channel between entrepreneurs and angel investors without giving up the 
anonymity of the latter (Harrison and Mason, 1996). Although much has been written about the sense and 
nonsense of the existence of a market failure in the angel financing market, conclusive evidence 
concerning its existence is lacking (Maula and Murray, 2003; Jääskeläinen et al., 2006). Therefore, the 
central research question of the first study is to what extent do information problems between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs exist and to what extent are they resolved by the creation of business angel 
networks? Focusing on these two issues then also allows us to address a third issue. Based on the 
assumptions of a market failure and entrepreneurial companies being important contributors to economic 
development, governments from all over the world have started to implement measures to stimulate the 
risk capital market. One of these measures is the public support and subsidization of business angel 
networks. Europe, for instance, counted 231 business angel networks in 2005, of which 68% were publicly 
funded (EBAN, 2005a;b). However, there is a lack of insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of these 
policies and theoretical arguments for government intervention can be made both ways. Based on the first 
two issues addressed in this paper, the third research question of the first study is thus: is government 
intervention through the public support of business angel networks warranted? 
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1.4 Post-investment problems between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
 
In addition to pre-investment information problems, angel investors and entrepreneurs are also confronted 
with post-investment problems. More particularly, based on conflict theory, several elements of the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and angel investors would make it especially susceptible to conflict. 
Generally, scarce resources, interdependent relations, personal differences, goal incompatibilities, 
interference to reach these goals and inefficient communication have been put forward as potential causes 
of conflict (Kochan et al., 1976; Bartos and Wehr, 2002; Wilmot and Hocker, 2005). All of these, 
although to different extents, are present in the angel investor – entrepreneur relationship. For example, 
angel investors and entrepreneurs are dependent on each other in fulfilling their roles within the portfolio 
company. As their degree of interdependency grows, however, so will their need to communicate and 
interact, which in turn will increase the potential for conflict (Brewer and Miller, 1996; Jehn and 
Bendersky, 2003). Empirical research on the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, 
which is similar to the relationship between angel investors and entrepreneurs in terms of conflict 
antecedents, has confirmed its conflict-prone nature (Higashide and Birley, 2002; Parhankangas and 
Landström, 2006; Yitshaki, 2008). Despite this, research into the “dark side” of the relationship between 
external investors and entrepreneurs has been lacking (Parhankangas and Landström, 2006, p. 775). 
Furthermore, drawing on intragroup conflict literature, conflicts between these parties could have a 
substantial impact on both performance and morale-related outcomes (Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; De 
Dreu and Beersma, 2005). Hence, the main research question addressed in the second and third paper is 
how do conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs impact both the performance of their 
portfolio companies and the attitudes of all individual parties involved?  
 
Within these two papers, angel investors and entrepreneurs will be considered as teams, defined as (two or 
more) interdependent individuals who work together to reach important, mutual goals (De Dreu et al., 
1999; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). Regardless of their overarching goal of value creation, it must be 
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acknowledged though that angel investors and entrepreneurs could have different subgoals. Hence, the 
distinction between angel investors and entrepreneurs forms a natural divide between these two parties, 
making conflict between them, strictu senso, intersubgroup conflict (Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). Conflict 
studies so far have focused on conflict within teams, but neglected to recognize that teams can consist of 
subgroups (Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). Taking the conflict debate to this other level will alter some of 
conflict‟s effects, allowing to shed some new light on its impact.  
 
Further, the focus is specifically on conflict‟s impact on the portfolio company‟s innovation and the 
individual‟s intentions to remain (invested) in the company. The particular outcomes selected in this 
research hence mirror two out of the three dimensions of team effectiveness (Hackman, 1987; Cohen and 
Bailey, 1990): (1) performance effectiveness in terms of quantity and quality of output, (2) team member 
attitudes and (3) behavioural outcomes. While innovation is a measure of performance effectiveness, 
intentions to remain in the company are a measure of team member attitudes. As such, these two outcomes 
are complementary in that together they provide us with a good overview of how conflicts between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs affect their combined effectiveness. Furthermore, both outcomes have 
received scant attention in the conflict literature, as opposed to, for instance, performance and satisfaction 
(Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). They also offer the benefit of combining a team-/company-level outcome 
with an individual one, allowing us to study conflict‟s impact across multiple levels. Finally, both 
innovation and intention to remain are of vital importance to entrepreneurial companies. First, as these 
ventures generally operate in a highly dynamic and volatile environment, consistently producing high 
levels of innovation is of the utmost importance to their performance, growth and success (Cho and Pucik, 
2005). Second, intentions to remain or leave have been shown to be important predictors of actual 
turnover or exit (O‟Reilly et al., 1991; Westerman and Cyr, 2004). As the exit of both (or either) the 
entrepreneur and angel investor could have dramatic consequences for the company involved, gaining an 
insight into what factors influence their intentions and motivations to voluntarily remain with or leave 
their businesses is crucial. 
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In addition to how conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs affect individual- and 
organizational-level outcomes, the second and third paper of this dissertation also tackle a second issue. 
Regardless of the specific conflict definition used, over time conflict researchers have almost exclusively 
focused on the perception, experience or awareness of incompatibilities (e.g. Thomas, 1992; Jehn, 1995; 
Tjosvold, 1998). However, as early conflict theorists noted, perceived incompatibilities do not necessarily 
reflect actual ones, nor will actual incompatibilities necessarily be perceived as such (Pondy, 1967; 
Deutsch, 1973). While perceived incompatibilities could be thought of as overt conflict, actual ones could 
be thought of as actual conflict (Pondy, 1967; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972). Although these can vary 
independently, conflict studies have emphasized the former and ignored the latter. In order to address this 
gap in the conflict literature, an additional research question posed in the second and third paper is hence 
how do perceived ànd actual incompatibilities between angel investors and entrepreneurs impact 
innovation and intentions to remain? The relationship between angel investors and entrepreneurs provides 
a very powerful setting to analyze the additional effects of actual conflicts as actual incompatibilities, i.e. 
goal incompatibilities, are prevalent (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Cable and Shane, 1997).  
 
In conclusion, the overall contribution of this dissertation is its insight into the problems angel investors 
and entrepreneurs have to deal with and the impact these problems have. As such, this dissertation adds to 
several streams in the academic literature. The first paper contributes to the academic evaluation and 
entrepreneurship literature by looking into whether or not the existence of a failure in the angel financing 
market is a myth and thus whether or not there really are „pre-investment problems‟. Furthermore, it 
contributes to the angel financing literature by assessing to what extent business angel networks provide a 
solution to this problem and hence should be supported by governments. The second and third paper add 
to the conflict literature by broadening the definition of conflict to incorporate both a perceptual and actual 
component. The second paper further expands the conflict literature by taking the conflict-innovation 
debate to the intersubgroup level and by better identifying under what conditions conflict will positively or 
negatively impact innovation. It also contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by showing how 
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perceived conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs impact the portfolio company‟s innovation 
and how this effect can be altered by their actual conflicts. The third paper also contributes to the 
entrepreneurship literature by providing a better insight into what determines investors‟ and entrepreneurs‟ 
intentions to remain with their businesses and exactly how detrimental conflicts can be. Finally, it also 
extends the conflict literature by shedding more light on how perceived conflict impacts intentions to 
remain. 
 
1.5 Overview of dissertation papers 
 
1.5.1 Assessment of government funding of Business Angel Networks in Flanders 
 
Principal topic 
Over the past decade, governments from all over the world have launched initiatives to stimulate risk 
capital markets (European Commission, 2003; Maula et al., 2007). Government intervention in the angel 
financing market is based on a market failure argument, caused by research and development (R&D) 
externalities and information problems (European Commission, 2003; Murray, 2007). R&D externalities 
refer to the value of R&D investments not being fully internalized, leading investors to provide less 
financing than socially optimal (Lerner, 1999; Cumming, 2007; Murray, 2007). Second, entrepreneurial 
companies often suffer from high levels of informational opaqueness due to their lack of track record, 
profit generation and collateralizable assets (Berger and Udell, 1998; Da Rin et al., 2006). Arm‟s length 
lenders hence constrain credit towards these companies, forcing them to rely on either angel financing or 
venture capital (Berger and Udell, 1998; Da Rin et al., 2006). However, venture capitalists have started to 
shift their focus toward larger and older investments (European Commission, 2003; Mason and Harrison, 
2003) and their investments tend to be geographically concentrated and focused on a few industries 
(Lerner, 2002; Carlson and Chakrabarti, 2007; Christensen, 2007). Therefore, angel financing might be 
especially important for small and young ventures, particularly in regions where venture capital is lacking 
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(Mason and Harrison, 1995). Furthermore, the angel financing market also suffers from a lack of 
transparency, impeding entrepreneurs and angel investors finding each other easily. Increasingly, 
governments take a regional approach to reducing this perceived angel financing market failure (European 
Commission, 2006). One such regional measure aimed at facilitating early-stage funding is the public 
funding and support of business angel networks, aimed at matching entrepreneurs and angel investors. As 
conclusive evidence concerning the existence of a market failure does not exist (Maula and Murray, 2003; 
Jääskeläinen et al., 2006) and there is a lack of insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of policies 
targeted towards angel investors, this paper analyses whether or not the public support of business angel 
networks is regional government money well spent. To do so, we evaluate whether the programme is 
based on the right assumptions and has achieved its goals. The existence of a market failure is evaluated 
by assessing whether or not angel-backed companies do indeed face financing constraints (prior to the 
actual angel investment), whether investors and entrepreneurs experience search problems and whether 
these companies are value-creating or thus worth saving. The latter condition must also hold as otherwise 
angel investors and entrepreneurs experiencing information problems would merely be the result of 
efficient resource allocation and hence not really represent a problem. Whether or not this government 
programme has reached its goals is evaluated by studying the beneficiary companies‟ contribution to 
economic development and by evaluating whether or not business angel networks help to reduce the 
above-mentioned problems. 
 
Method 
For this study the cooperation was obtained from the four only business angel networks operating in 
Flanders (a region in Belgium) from 1999 to 2004. Together these networks represent 140 angel investors 
and 58 deals, in which 54 business angels invested. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with 
business angels who had invested through such a network and the entrepreneurs of companies who had 
received financing through those same networks (34 and 28 interviews respectively). Second, pre- and 
post-investment financial account data were compared between a sample of 84 angel-backed companies 
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(divided into a subsample of 34 companies that received financing through a business angel network and 
another subsample of 50 companies that received angel financing through another channel) and a matched 
benchmark group of non-angel-backed companies (matched on age, industry and size).  
 
Findings  
This study provides strong support for the existence of information problems in the angel financing 
market, resulting in financing constraints. However, although these problems do plague entrepreneurial 
companies, we cannot label this as a market failure quite yet as angel-backed companies are value-
destroying in the short term. However, a J-curve trend in the value creation measures is noticeable, what 
might point to these companies just needing more time to deploy their capital in the most effective way 
(Lerner, 1999). Further, clear evidence is found for business angel networks reducing the information and 
financing problems of entrepreneurial companies. These networks finance particularly young companies 
with high financial risk in high-technology industries, which are exactly those companies most prone to 
information asymmetries and financial constraints. Moreover, both entrepreneurs and angel investors state 
that they would not have known each other without those networks. Finally, these companies also 
contribute to economic development and growth through value-added and job creation and generate 
significant positive indirect effects. In conclusion, the fact that this programme has successfully reached 
its goals, created many positive indirect effects and that the companies supported through this programme 
hold value-creating potential lead to the conclusion that public support for business angel networks is 
justified. However, in order to make this tentative conclusion more robust, a longer-term evaluation of the 
value created by companies that received financing through such a network is indispensable. 
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1.5.2 Conflict between angel investors and entrepreneurs: Perception, reality and its 
impact on innovation 
 
Principal topic 
Intragroup conflict has often been mentioned as one of the key processes affecting team and 
organizational innovation (De Dreu, 2006; West and Sacramento, 2006). However, there has been a lot of 
debate as to whether or not conflict is beneficial to innovation. This paper aims to shed new light on this 
relationship by taking this debate to the intersubgroup level. More specifically, I argue that angel investors 
and entrepreneurs in conflict could be thought of as warring factions within a team (Bezrukova and Jehn, 
2008). In cases of task-related disagreements, their interaction may hence become more of a competitive 
game or combat with each faction trying to reach their own subgoals (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; 
Amason, 1996; Brewer and Miller, 1996; LaBianca et al., 1998), rather than investors and entrepreneurs 
being different individuals contributing different ideas about the task at hand. This will increase distrust, 
use of politics, cognitive barriers and will block information sharing and cognitive processing (Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1988; Baba et al., 2004; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). As such a truly open and creative 
debate between angel investors and entrepreneurs will become less likely (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007), 
which should result in lower levels of organizational innovation. The same negative effect on innovation 
is hypothesized for two other types of conflict between angel investors and entrepreneurs, i.e. relationship 
and process conflicts, mainly due to associated negative emotions, absorption of time, energy and 
cognitive capacity necessary for creative thinking (Jehn, 1995; Pelled, 1996; Hinds and Bailey, 2003; 
Matsuo, 2006). In addition, it is also hypothesized that actual conflicts between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs, defined as actual goal incompatibilities between these two parties, will alter the above-
mentioned perceived conflict‟s effects, regardless the type. More specifically, it is argued that based on 
the negative side-effects of actual conflicts (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, 1998), the negative emotions, 
frustrations, competitive tactics and disabled information sharing process associated with perceived 
conflicts, regardless the type, will be intensified in teams where actual incompatibilities between angel 
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investors and entrepreneurs are high. Arguments from the entrepreneurial finance literature would point in 
the same direction. Namely, higher goal incompatibility between investors and entrepreneurs will increase 
the frequency of communication between them while reducing the quality of the information exchanged 
(Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). This will make conflicts more salient and 
simultaneously obstruct the information-sharing process between investors and entrepreneurs, hence both 
strengthening perceived conflict‟s negative effect on innovation, regardless the type. 
 
Method 
Hypotheses were tested based on a dataset of Belgian angel-backed companies. Out of 107 (potentially) 
eligible companies, 28 participated. Data were collected via two instruments: (1) all independent and 
moderating variables were gathered through questionnaires and (2) information on the dependent variable 
was gathered through the companies‟ financial accounts. Responses were sought from all entrepreneurial 
team members and angel investors who had a seat on the Board of Directors. The teams averaged 3 
members and represented 75 individual responses (of which 35 angel investors and 40 entrepreneurs). 
Scales were validated using confirmatory factor analysis and intraclass correlation coefficients and within-
group agreement indices were calculated to justify aggregation of the data to the team level. Hypotheses 
were tested using partial least squares analysis with bootstrapping. 
 
Findings 
The findings reveal a significant, negative effect of perceived task and relationship conflicts between 
angel investors and entrepreneurs on the portfolio company‟s innovation, but they do not confirm a main 
effect for process conflict. This supports the view that in cases of task-related disagreements, conflicting 
subgroups could be seen as warring factions engaging in competitive tactics and politics, leading to 
distrust and hampered cognitive processing. While the support for relationship conflict‟s negative effect is 
in line with previous research, the results for process conflict were somewhat surprising. An alternative 
explanation for this lack of support could be the specifics of the research setting. More specifically, 
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process conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs refer to disagreements regarding role 
definitions, ownership distribution, voting rights etc. These are precisely the topics that will probably 
already have been discussed prior to the investment. As such, it might be that there are not many process 
conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs overall. Low average levels of process conflict and 
little variation in the data corroborate this argument. Finally, the results also show that low levels of actual 
conflicts between conflicting parties can reduce perceived conflict‟s negative effects, regardless of 
whether these conflicts are related to the task at hand, personal frustration or resource allocation and task 
responsibilities issues. These results thus support the view that actual conflicts should be considered 
equally important as perceived conflicts in that the former can substantially alter the latter‟s effects.  
 
1.5.3 Angel investors and entrepreneurs: Do they live happily ever after? 
 
Principal topic 
Despite the importance of exit to both entrepreneurs and investors, little is known about what factors 
influence their intentions and motivations to voluntarily remain with or leave their businesses (Wincent et 
al., 2008; DeTienne, 2008). With regard to external investors, previous exit studies have focused on 
investor preferences with regard to how (e.g. IPO, acquisition, trade sale) and when to exit, determinants 
of these exit preferences and the role of contracts in the exit decision (see, for instance, Mason and 
Harrison, 2002a; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Hellmann, 2006). None of them have looked into their 
intentions to exit though, nor approached this decision from a socio-psychological point of view. With 
regard to entrepreneurial exit, only recently have researchers begun to look into this crucial aspect of the 
entrepreneurial life cycle (DeTienne and Cardon, 2007; DeTienne, 2008; Wincent et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, intentions to remain or leave have been shown to be important predictors of actual turnover 
or exit (O‟Reilly et al., 1991; Westerman and Cyr, 2004), making this an outcome of vital importance to 
the entrepreneurship literature. Therefore, building on and extending conflict theory, this paper studies the 
impact of perceived and actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on their intentions to 
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remain (invested) in the company. More specifically, perceived task and relationship conflicts are 
hypothesized to negatively impact both parties‟ intentions to remain due to feelings of anger, stress, 
anxiety, animosity and discomfort resulting in dissatisfaction (Jehn, 1995; Amason, 1996; Jehn et al., 
1997). Extending conflict theory, it is also hypothesized that actual conflicts, as actual goal 
incompatibilities, between angel investors and entrepreneurs will reduce both parties‟ intentions to remain 
due to a decrease in cooperation and increase in competitive tactics and less positive attitudes towards the 
partner, making problem solving more difficult (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, 1998; Tjosvold, 1998; Si and 
Bruton, 2005). Finally, in order to test one of the key assumptions in entrepreneurial finance literature, it is 
also hypothesized that entrepreneurs will want to outstay their angel investors. 
 
Method 
Data for this study were gathered in two locations, namely Continental Europe (Belgium) and California 
(USA). Out of 107 (potentially) eligible Belgian companies, 28 participated and out of 805 (potentially) 
eligible Californian companies, 26 participated. Data were collected through questionnaires, which were 
distributed to all entrepreneurial team members and angel investors who had a seat on the Board of 
Directors or were actively involved in strategic decision making. As the number of teams was rather small 
in both locations separately it was deemed desirable to combine them into one larger sample. Multigroup 
confirmatory factor analysis provided support for combining the Belgian and Californian samples into one 
larger sample, consisting of 54 teams and 137 individuals, of which 72 entrepreneurs and 65 angel 
investors. Intraclass correlation coefficients and within-group agreement indices were calculated to justify 
aggregation of the data to the team level. Hypotheses were tested using hierarchical linear modelling, 
appropriate for multilevel models (Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002). 
 
Findings 
The findings of this study support the view that actual conflicts, through increased competition between 
conflicting parties and a lack of problem-solving, result in lower intentions to remain. As such, it should 
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be considered equally important as perceived conflicts in that both have a significant, separate and unique 
impact on team members‟ morale. The results further provide support for perceived task conflict‟s 
negative effect on intent to remain, due to associated feelings of stress, tension and discomfort, but not so 
for perceived relationship conflict. When the same model was run for individual-level satisfaction, the 
opposite results (i.e. a significant, negative effect for perceived relationship conflict and an insignificant 
effect for perceived task conflict) were found. In combination with actual conflict‟s negative main effect, 
this could point to deciding whether or not to stay in the team or company is more of a business decision 
for entrepreneurs and angel investors than an emotional one (which it is for more traditional teams). The 
findings further revealed a significant positive effect for perceived performance, which would seem to 
substantiate viewing intention to remain as more business- than emotion-driven. This effect was much 
stronger though for angel investors than entrepreneurs. Finally, this study also confirmed the assumption 
implicit to many entrepreneurial finance papers that, all else constant, entrepreneurs do indeed want to 
remain with their companies longer than their respective angel investors.  
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Abstract 
We evaluate whether government intervention through the subsidization of business angel networks 
(BANs) enhances regional economic growth in Flanders, Belgium. We show that, firstly, BANs reduce 
the information and financing problems entrepreneurial companies face. Secondly, these companies 
contribute to economic development and growth. Thirdly, there are positive indicators of future potential, 
such as an upward evolution in value creation and ability to raise follow-on financing. Finally, the 
programme has many positive indirect effects. This leads us to tentatively conclude that public BAN 
support is warranted. However, to make this conclusion more robust requires a longer-term evaluation. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, governments from all over the world have launched initiatives to stimulate risk 
capital markets (European Commission, 2003b; Maula et al., 2007). Risk capital refers to external equity 
financing of entrepreneurial companies and encompasses both formal venture capital and informal risk 
capital, also known as (business) angel financing (European Commission, 2001). Formal venture capital is 
provided by institutional, professional investors, while angel financing is provided by private investors 
with no family or friend connections to their investees (Harrison and Mason, 1999; EVCA, 2002). Sohl 
(2005) estimates that 227 000 angel investors in the USA invested $23.1 billion in 49 500 companies in 
2005, compared to venture capital investors investing $21.7 billion in only 2 939 companies 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers et al., 2006).  There is a relative scarcity of statistics on European angel 
investments. Mason (2006) estimates that 20 000 to 40 000 U.K. angels invest £0.5 billion to £1.0 billion 
in 3 000 to 6 000 companies yearly, backing eight times more start-ups than venture capitalists.   
 
While a small number of growth-oriented start-ups contribute disproportionately to innovation, economic 
growth and job creation (e.g. Wong et al., 2005; Fritsch and Falck, 2007), policy-makers believe that there 
is a market failure in that many entrepreneurial companies are prevented from exploiting growth 
opportunities due to a lack of risk capital (Mason and Harrison, 2003; Carlson and Chakrabarti, 2007). 
Hence they have established support programmes to stimulate risk capital financing and thereby foster 
economic growth (Cumming, 2007). This perceived failure in risk capital markets is addressed either by 
directly increasing the supply of risk capital or by increasing expected returns to investors through 
decreasing taxation, improving exit markets, or reducing barriers to entrepreneurship (Da Rin et al., 2006).  
 
Risk capital has been shown to have a strong regional dimension, with risk capital investors often 
specializing in investing in a geographically concentrated region (Carlson and Chakrabarti, 2007; 
Christensen, 2007). Whereas the European Commission argues that venture capital activity needs to be 
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regionally clustered in order to create necessary levels of specialization within high-technology clusters, 
the OECD and some EU member states have argued for a more even regional distribution (Martin et al., 
2002). Following the latter view, government policies throughout Europe and the USA have often focused 
on ensuring an adequate regional supply of risk capital (e.g. Venkataraman, 2004; Christensen, 2007).  
      
Various studies have assessed the impact of public policies aimed at stimulating formal venture capital 
markets (e.g. Lerner, 1999; 2002; Ayayi, 2004; Da Rin et al., 2006; Cumming, 2007). There is, however, a 
lack of insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of policies targeted towards angel investors, such as 
tax reliefs, support of business angel networks (BANs) or business angel co-investment funds (Maula et 
al., 2007). The current paper evaluates one type of government intervention programme to stimulate 
informal risk capital: the support of BANs. It focuses on one Belgian region, Flanders, as this allows an 
in-depth assessment. It assesses whether the programme is warranted by evaluating whether it is based on 
the right assumptions and has achieved its goals. 
 
We proceed by providing theoretical rationales for government intervention in the informal risk capital 
market and describe how and why the Flemish government has supported BANs. Thereafter, we discuss 
the research method used to evaluate the programme. In the results section, we evaluate its direct effects 
and briefly discuss its indirect effects.  
 
2.2 Government intervention in the informal risk capital market 
 
Government intervention in the informal risk capital market is based on a market failure argument, caused 
by R&D externalities and information problems (European Commission, 2003b; Murray, 2007). R&D 
externalities refer to the fact that the value of R&D investments is not fully internalized, as they generate 
benefits for parties outside the company (Lerner, 1999). While investors would like to appropriate all 
returns generated by high-potential companies given their high perceived risks (Da Rin et al., 2006; 
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Murray, 2007), R&D externalities prevent this, leading investors to provide less financing than would be 
socially optimal (Cumming, 2007; Murray, 2007). Small firms might be especially prone to this due to 
“their lesser market power and inability to finance the aggressive defence of intellectual ownership 
infringements” (Murray, 2007, p. 14).  
 
A second source of market failure is the high level of information asymmetry in small and young 
companies, which is caused by a lack of track record and profit generation and results in high uncertainty 
for investors. Hence, these companies are constrained from access to public capital markets and bank 
financing (Da Rin et al., 2006). Moreover, R&D investments do not create collateralisable assets. As 
financing of low-collateral companies requires monitoring (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997), arm‟s-length 
lenders constrain credit towards these companies (Da Rin et al., 2006). Therefore, they have to rely on 
angel investors or venture capitalists as they monitor their investments more actively (Berger and Udell, 
1998).  
 
Venture capitalists and angel investors mitigate information problems, which may result in adverse 
selection and moral hazard risks, through extensive due diligence pre-investment, writing extensive 
contracts at investment and monitoring post-investment (Berger and Udell, 1998). However, due to scale 
economies in these costly processes and in order to reduce risk further, venture capitalists have shifted 
their focus toward larger and older investments (European Commission, 2003a; Mason and Harrison, 
2003). Furthermore, venture capital investments tend to be geographically concentrated and focused on a 
few industries (Lerner, 2002; Carlson and Chakrabarti, 2007; Christensen, 2007). Hence, it is argued that 
small and young ventures, especially those active in regions or industries with little venture capital, have 
difficulties in raising sufficient capital even if they have great value-creating potential. Therefore they 
resort to angel funding, which therefore may be particularly important in regions where venture capital is 
lacking (Mason and Harrison, 1995). 
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Another information problem is the lack of transparency in the informal risk capital market. Entrepreneurs 
are not always fully informed about the array of possible financing sources and their characteristics (Van 
Auken, 2001). Even if they understand angel financing, they are not always able to locate angel investors, 
as these often do not want to make their investment intentions public. In the same vein, angel investors 
have trouble in locating valuable investment opportunities (Mason and Harrison, 2002). These problems 
led to the creation of BANs, which provide an information channel between entrepreneurs and angel 
investors without giving up the privacy of the latter (Harrison and Mason, 1996b). 
 
Conclusive evidence concerning the existence of a market failure is lacking (Maula and Murray, 2003; 
Jääskeläinen et al., 2006), as the lack of risk capital may be due more to the poor quality of the demand 
than to the unavailability of capital (Mason and Harrison, 2002; 2003). Venkataraman (2004) argues that 
risk capital is a necessary, but non-sufficient condition for fostering regional growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship. Intangible regional assets, such as access to novel ideas, role models or region-specific 
opportunities, are equally important. Merely injecting risk capital in a region may thus lead to promoting 
low-quality entrepreneurship (Venkataraman, 2004).The lack of financing per se is not enough to 
constitute a market failure; the financing constraint has to regard value-creating companies.  
 
2.3 Regional approach to informal risk capital: Business Angel Networks 
 
Increasingly, governments take a regional approach to reduce the perceived risk capital market failure 
(European Commission, 2006): policy is implemented at the lowest level possible, on the condition that it 
is still efficient (Sunley et al., 2005). In addition to addressing specific regional market conditions, 
regional risk capital programmes are also warranted as geographic proximity is important in the early-
stage investor-investee relationship (Sunley et al., 2005; Carlson and Chakrabarti, 2007). For an 
investment to take place, face-to-face contact between investor and investee is required to reduce 
information asymmetries and create trust (EBAN, 1998; Aernoudt, 1999). Proximity further facilitates 
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active coaching and advising, allowing companies to benefit more from the investor‟s network and effort 
(Mason and Harrison, 1995; Sunley et al., 2005).  
 
One regional measure aimed at facilitating early-stage funding is the public funding and support of BANs. 
Based on an evaluation of the potential of establishing regional BANs in Europe and the positive results of 
a pioneer programme in the U.K., the Commission stimulated, facilitated and financed the establishment 
of BANs in the late 1990s (EBAN, 1998; Harrison and Mason, 1999). Other measures that stimulate the 
informal risk capital market, such as tax incentives, improved legislation, education of angel investors and 
entrepreneurs or co-investment schemes, cannot work effectively without first reducing search problems 
(Mason, 2006).  
 
Europe counted 231 BANs in 2005, of which 68% were publicly funded (EBAN, 2005a;b). It was initially 
assumed that public subsidies were needed to launch BANs, but that these could become self-supporting 
after five years thanks to revenues from membership fees, success fees or sponsoring (Harrison and 
Mason, 1996a; Van Rompuy, 1999). This assumption is, however, not confirmed (Harrison and Mason, 
1996a). Governments are now confronted with the question whether subsidies have to cease as initially 
foreseen - which would result in most BANs closing down - or whether long-lasting structural subsidies 
are justified to maintain the BANs. A critical evaluation of BAN support is hence timely. The success of 
BANs has been both widely endorsed and strongly contended, but there is no agreement on their 
effectiveness (Harrison and Mason, 1996a;b; Mason and Harrison, 2002). Harrison and Mason (1996a;b) 
provided the only BAN evaluation study to our knowledge and so represents our only benchmark. In order 
to advance their work and make a thorough evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of public BAN support, 
we concentrate on one region in Belgium, Flanders, from 1999 to 2004.  
 
The first Belgian BAN, Vlerick BAN, was subsidised by the Flemish government in 1999. Three other 
BANs were subsequently founded and subsidized. Together, they were the only BANs operating in 
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Flanders until 2004 (after which they all merged) and all operated in the same way, through investor 
forums. These forums are events where entrepreneurs can pitch their ideas face-to-face to BAN members 
and discuss them in more depth with potentially interested angel investors (European Commission, 
2003a). The Flemish government, following the European Commission‟s rationales, considered the BANs 
as a way to reduce the financing problems entrepreneurial companies face by reducing information 
problems (Van Rompuy, 1999). The financing of the networks was considered as one way to promote 
entrepreneurship and innovation in Flanders (Van Rompuy, 1999). 
  
Together, these four BANs represented 140 angel investors1 and 58 deals in 55 companies, in which 54 
angel investors invested between 1999 and 2004. The total amount of subsidies granted to the four BANs 
between 1999 and 2004 was € 856 741, representing 50% of their operating costs. The subsidy per deal 
was € 14 800 or 21% lower than the € 18 900 per deal for the UK Department of Trade and Industry‟s 
(DTI) informal investment demonstration projects (Harrison and Mason, 1996b).  
 
Evaluating public funding of BANs within one region has advantages. The four BANs all operate within 
the same economic, legislative and fiscal environment, increasing the internal validity of the evaluation. 
The external validity of the study is nevertheless warranted based on following arguments. First, Belgian 
socio-economic indicators as income distribution, employment rate, social security fees and trade balance 
are similar to indicators in other European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, 
Spain and Italy (Stroobandt et al., 2005). Second, the Flemish BANs are similar to BANs in comparable 
European countries. A Flemish BAN closed, on average, 4.5 deals in 2003, compared to 0.2, 4.7 and six 
deals per BAN in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, respectively. A Flemish BAN counted, on average, 35 
angel members compared with 26 members in Germany, 35 in Italy and 45 in Spain (EBAN, 2005a). The 
informal risk capital market is less mature in Continental Europe than in the USA and UK (EBAN, 
2005a). For example, the UK counted 34 BANs in 2004, a number similar to the USA, with an average of 
                                                            
1 This might be overestimated as we could only exclude double-counting for BAs that made BAN investments. 
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five deals per BAN (EBAN, 2005b). Third, the fiscal treatment of angel investments is comparable with 
that in other countries, except that capital gains realised by private individuals are not taxed. Finally, 
Flanders is a region with five million inhabitants and thus fits into the criteria suggested for establishing a 
BAN (EBAN, 1998). Hence, its evaluation can present relevant conclusions for other European regions.  
 
2.4 How to evaluate government programmes? 
 
According to Lerner and colleagues, the “starting point for any evaluation of a government programme is 
the goals it was designed to achieve” (Lerner et al., 2005, p. 140), which is what most evaluation studies 
do (e.g. Boyns et al., 2005; Maula and Murray, 2003; Ayayi, 2004; Lerner et al., 2005; Cumming, 2007). 
Through BAN subsidies, the Flemish government‟s goal was to stimulate regional entrepreneurship, 
innovation and job creation by reducing the perceived information and financing problems (sub-goals) 
entrepreneurial companies face (Van Rompuy, 1999). The BANs‟ mission was to create a market where 
entrepreneurs looking for finance and angel investors looking for investments could find each other. In 
addition, one needs to assess the assumptions the initiative and its objectives are based upon (Maula and 
Murray, 2003). The assumption the Flemish government and the European Commission made when 
subsidising BANs was that there was a market failure, namely that some value-creating entrepreneurial 
companies suffered from financing problems. Finally, in order to assess the full impact of a government 
programme, one needs to go beyond its direct effects (Harrison and Mason, 1996b; Lerner, 1999). Positive 
indirect effects of the BAN subsidies may include the enhancement of overall awareness for angel 
financing or entrepreneurs‟ and investors‟ education.  
 
Therefore, in order to evaluate government funding of BANs, following questions need to be answered: 
1. Is there a failure in the informal risk capital market?  
a. Did the companies financed through BANs suffer from information problems and 
resulting financing constraints? 
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b. Were these companies value-creating? 
2. Do BANs reduce the financing problems of entrepreneurial companies?  
3. Do these companies contribute to regional economic development?  
4. What are the indirect effects of the BAN subsidies? 
  
2.5 Method 
 
2.5.1 Research method 
 
Researchers have generally used either one of two approaches to study the foregoing questions. Some 
relied on qualitative data by gathering general information on the government measures taken and/or by 
interviewing beneficiaries or experts (e.g. Murray, 1998; Dossani and Kenney, 2002; Maula and Murray, 
2003). Others compared the performance of beneficiaries with that of comparable non-beneficiaries using 
a quantitative approach (e.g. Lerner, 1999; Ayayi, 2004; Cumming, 2007). A contribution of our study is 
that we combine both approaches, leading to a richer understanding and rigorous analysis of the research 
questions. 
 
First interviews were solicited from the beneficiaries, being all 55 entrepreneurs and 54 angel investors 
who were involved in a deal through one of the four Flemish BANs. This resulted in 28 interviews with 
entrepreneurs (including three of which managed failed companies) and 34 interviews with angel 
investors. The interviews give insight into how market participants, i.e. entrepreneurs and investors, 
perceive market failure in terms of information and financing problems and in the contribution of BANs in 
reducing this failure.  
 
As interviews provide subjective views, they were complemented with hard data, namely the financial 
accounts of all companies that received angel financing through one of the BANs (BAN-backed 
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companies). We compare their pre-investment debt capacity with that of a matched benchmark group of 
non-angel-backed companies. In order for a market failure to exist, BAN-backed companies should have 
depleted their debt capacity before angel investment. If not, they should be able to access traditional debt 
financing sources. A firm has depleted its debt capacity if its financial risk, measured as the ratio of the 
book value of debt to total assets, is high or if it does not have the capacity to service the fixed interest and 
principal repayments attached to debt, measured by its internally generated cash flows (Lemmon and 
Zender, 2004). Profitability measures such as return on assets, pre-tax profit and operational profit were 
added as further indicators of a firm‟s risk (e.g. Altman, 1968). 
 
A second pre-investment comparison relates to companies that did not resort to a BAN but nevertheless 
received angel financing. This is relevant as it might be argued that, in an efficient risk capital market, 
entrepreneurs with value-creating projects should be able to raise angel financing even without a BAN. 
First, having a poor personal network might be an indication of the inability of the entrepreneur to 
network with third parties that are relevant for conducting business, hence increasing the odds that the 
entrepreneur will not be able to develop the venture satisfactorily. Second, parties within an entrepreneur‟s 
network face lower information asymmetries as they are able to better assess potential agency problems. 
Failure to find a personally known investor might be an indication of excessive agency risk. Hence, 
entrepreneurs with a high ability and low agency risk should be able to find an angel investor without a 
BAN. If the above reasoning holds, we expect BAN-backed companies to be more risky than companies 
that found angel financing through another channel. If, however, the risk of both groups is the same, then 
this is additional evidence of market inefficiencies.  
 
Further, in order for a market failure to exist, companies facing financing constraints should have value-
creating projects. In order to assess how “effectively and profitably” (Murray, 2007, p. 8) the BAN-backed 
companies employ their financing, their return on assets (ROA) is measured from the year of angel 
participation up to four years thereafter. Ideally, the ROA should be compared with the companies‟ 
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funding cost to assess value creation. As it is difficult to estimate the funding cost of unquoted companies, 
the ROA of BAN-backed companies is compared to both that of non-angel-backed companies and 
companies that found angel financing through another channel. Hence, it is assumed that these companies 
have a comparable funding cost. Additionally, the same analyses are conducted on value added - a proxy 
for sales – (rescaled by total assets) as a robustness check. Value-added is the difference between 
operating income and the value of inputs.  
 
In order to assess whether BAN-backed companies contribute to economic development, we studied the 
absolute amount and growth in employment and value-added (Lerner, 1999; EVCA, 2002) as well as the 
federal taxes paid by the BAN-backed companies (EVCA, 2002). Growth is calculated as the average 
yearly growth from the year of angel investment to the last available year (Heirman and Clarysse, 2005). 
This growth measure has limitations as it assumes a linear growth process. Furthermore, a longer-term 
growth measure would be more desirable (Lerner, 1999), but unfortunately data that would enable this 
analysis are not available. 
 
The population of BAN-backed companies is identified through the deal list of the four Flemish BANs. 
The sample of companies that received angel financing through another channel is based on two sources: 
(i) the interviews with the angel investors who have invested through a BAN and were asked to identify 
all their investments, (ii) a database with the financing sources of 221 Flemish high-technology start-ups 
(Heirman and Clarysse, 2005). After removing overlaps between data sources and companies that could 
not be further identified, 44 BAN-backed companies were retained and 66 angel-backed companies that 
found an angel investor through another channel. Further, companies that received angel financing before 
1992 and after August 2003 were also removed.  The final samples consist of 34 BAN-backed companies 
and 50 angel-backed companies that received angel financing through another channel.  
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In order to assess the marginal impact of a government programme, a sample of similar companies that 
did not benefit from this programme was needed (Lerner et al., 2005). Hence, the BAN-backed companies 
are matched with non-angel-backed companies on age, industry and size (Lerner, 1999; Puri and 
Zarutskie, 2007). Age is measured in the year before angel participation or the year of angel participation 
if the angel investor participated at start-up.  Second, the BAN-backed companies are matched on industry 
based on the NACE-BEL codes (comparable with 3-digit SIC codes).  Third, we match on size, proxied 
by total assets.   
 
2.5.2 Sample description  
 
The 34 interviewed angel investors2, representing 36 out of the 55 BAN-backed companies, have invested 
€ 11.7 million through a BAN or € 324 489 per company.  Extrapolating this amount to all BAN-backed 
companies, we estimate that angel investors invested € 17.8 million through BANs, or € 20.83 per euro of 
government money spent.  Furthermore, the 34 angel investors have invested an additional € 22.8 million3 
in companies found through another channel or € 519 055 per company.  Angel investors‟ attitudes, 
investment behaviour and demographic characteristics are consistent with those of angel investors in other 
countries (e.g. Mason, 2006), further supporting the external validity of our study. 
 
The 28 BAN-backed companies, whose entrepreneurs were interviewed, have the following 
characteristics.  The angel investor participated within the first two years after incorporation in 15 out of 
the 28 companies. Each company has, on average, received € 236 571 from BAN investors. If 
extrapolated, this would amount to € 13.0 million invested through a BAN or € 15.19 per euro of 
                                                            
2 As for representativeness tests, age and assets of the different subsamples of BAN-backed companies are not 
significantly different from the population of 55 BAN-backed companies. As we have no data on the 20 angel 
investors that did not participate in the study, we do not know whether the interviewed angel investors are 
representative for the angel investors that have invested through one of the BANs.   
3 These amounts are lower limits since not all angel investors were willing to provide this information. 
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government money spent on the BANs4. The Flemish BAN investors invested € 2.6 million per year, 
which is twice the amount invested by the British angel investors under the DTI initiative in the early 
1990s, € 1.4 million per year (Harrison and Mason, 1996b).  
 
The companies in the quantitative sample closely match the profile of the companies represented in the 
qualitative sample in terms of industry and age at angel participation. Further, the BAN-backed 
companies‟ profiles fit well into the traditional view on market failure. Young and/or small high-growth 
oriented and/or high-technology companies are the most likely victims of a market failure, due to R&D 
externalities, informational opaqueness and low levels of collateral (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1998; Da Rin 
et al., 2006; Cumming, 2007; Murray, 2007). A total of 56% of the companies in the sample received 
angel financing under the age of two; 71% received it under the age of five. Furthermore, the majority of 
our sample (71%) comprises small enterprises with 10 or fewer employees. Finally, more than half of our 
sample is active in technological activities, ranging from the production of natural resources to ICT and 
R&D services, to high-technology manufacturing. Five companies have failed since the angel investment. 
Taken together, the BAN-backed companies are in the target group of high-growth oriented companies 
with likely market failure problems (Cumming, 2007).  
 
2.6 Results 
 
2.6.1 Market failure: Financing and information problems  
 
The qualitative and quantitative analyses suggest that financing and information problems exist in the 
informal risk capital market. More particularly, the pre-investment debt capacity of BAN-backed 
companies is significantly lower compared with non-angel-backed companies (Table 2.1, Panel A). As 
                                                            
4 This differs from the €20.83 mentioned before since there is no perfect overlap between the interviewed BAs‟ 
investments and the interviewed companies. 
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much as 96% of their assets are financed with debt, compared with 82% for the non-angel-backed sample 
(although the difference is not statistically significant). Their lower cash flows and profit ratios suggest 
that their financial risk is higher and therefore the probability of raising financing from traditional sources 
is lower. The qualitative interviews provide further evidence for the financing constraints. When asked 
why they opted for angel financing, 18 entrepreneurs stated that there were no other options. Conversely, 
merely five out of 28 entrepreneurs referred to expected angel involvement and value-added as a motive 
for looking for angel financing. Although 17 entrepreneurs stated that they had another investor in 
prospect at the time of angel investment - either banks or family and friends - they always admitted that 
both options were less suitable compared to angel money. They were either reluctant to mix personal and 
business life or the stringent conditions that go along with bank financing were not optimal for the 
company. Quantitative and qualitative results hence support the existence of financing constraints for 
entrepreneurial companies: these companies could probably not have found (the total amount of) financing  
through other sources. 
 
Table 2.1: Test of the market failure argument 
 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
(1) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and non-angel-backed companies, we used Wilcoxon rank tests 
(2) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and the other angel-backed companies, we used Mann-Whitney tests 
Variable  
(in 000 EUR) 
BAN-backed 
compared to: 
(1) Non-angel-backed 
companies 
(2) Angel-backed 
through another channel 
 Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N 
 
PANEL A: Pre-investment comparisons 
 
Return on assets (ROA) % -33.22 46.55 21 1.05*** 24.72 24 -15.26** 85.25 21 
Pre-tax profit -214.81 569.63 21 -3.83* 164.78 24 -36.41** 96.98 22 
Operational profit -181.10 567.15 21 8.13** 166.92 24 -25.09** 103.59 22 
Cash flow -96.52 445.21 21 35.68** 175.69 22 -3.36** 97.57 22 
Total debt/total assets (%) 0.96 0.60 21 0.82 0.34 24 0.81** 0.56 22 
 
PANEL B: Analysis of post-investment value creation 
 
ROA – Year 0 -38.53 51.34 26 11.76*** 19.87 29 -23.23** 39.21 26 
ROA – Year 2 -38.53 72.12 28 12.34*** 19.11 32 -32.71** 69.85 45 
ROA – Year 3 -42.38 134.23 23 11.09** 21.73 26 -26.36** 50.63 43 
ROA – Year 4  6.97 95.85 14 5.44** 10.31 19 -27.32** 72.15 40 
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We further find support for information problems in the informal risk capital market. There are no 
differences between the financial risk of BAN-backed companies and companies that found angel 
investors through another channel, neither pre-investment (Table 2.1, Panel A) nor post-investment (not 
shown in Table 2.1). This indicates that the risk of companies turning to BANs for financing is not higher 
than that of other angel-backed companies5. In other words, BANs do not systematically attract the most 
risky companies unable to find financing through other channels. The only difference between the BAN-
backed companies and the companies that found angel investors through another channel is that the former 
experienced information problems in locating an angel investor. Twenty of the interviewed entrepreneurs 
stated they approached a BAN as this was the only known way for them to get in contact with angel 
investors. Conversely, only five entrepreneurs were confident that they would have found angel financing 
if the BANs had not existed.  
 
Likewise, the angel investors stated that they would not have known the companies without the BANs in 
82% of the deals, confirming information problems. If the BANs had not existed, the angel investors 
would thus not have been able to invest € 14.2 million. In other words, each euro of government subsidies 
has generated € 16.63 of angel money, which otherwise would not have been invested in these companies. 
As it is possible that the angel investors would have invested in other companies, the € 14.2 million 
invested through the BANs probably overestimates the marginal impact of the BANs. However, 74% of 
the angel investors stated that they still had funds left for additional investments. Taken together, 
qualitative and quantitative results consistently support the existence of information problems, both for 
angel investors and for entrepreneurs, and the positive role of BANs in reducing these problems. This 
study provides strong support for the assumption that the informal risk capital market is plagued by 
information problems leading to financing constraints.  
 
                                                            
5 In addition, these samples are not only comparable in terms of their average financial risk, but also in terms of their 
risk variability (variances in financial risk measures, pre- and post-investment, are not significantly different 
(p=0.49) between the two samples). 
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2.6.2 Market failure: Value creation 
 
The next step is to investigate whether BAN-backed companies create value. If not, a failure to raise funds 
outside BANs is merely the outcome of efficient resource allocation. Funding should not be channelled to 
non-value-creating companies.  
 
The results do not confirm the value-creating argument in the short term. BAN-backed companies create 
significantly less value than similar non-angel-backed companies and even destroy value up to three years 
after angel investment (Table 2.1, Panel B): the mean ROA of BAN-backed companies is negative, while 
non-angel-backed companies have positive ROAs. However, the difference between the two samples 
becomes less significant over the years to disappear in year 4 as the ROA of BAN-backed companies 
improves. The robustness check confirms these results.6 The results indicate a J-curve effect: BAN-backed 
companies do not invest in a cost-effective manner in the short term, but this could be due to large up-
front investments resulting in delayed returns
7
. 
 
Further, negative ROAs, low value-added and an upward trend in both are also present in the sample of 
companies that are backed by angel investors, found outside a BAN. This again indicates that there are 
few differences between the two groups of angel-backed companies. 
 
In conclusion, although financing and information problems do plague entrepreneurial companies, this 
cannot be labelled a market failure yet as the angel-backed companies are value destroying in the short 
term. However, we do notice a J-curve trend in the measures of value creation, what might point to the 
fact that these companies need more time to deploy their capital in the most effective way (Lerner, 1999). 
The short-term analyses may therefore underestimate the long-term value creation potential. For now, we 
                                                            
6 BAN-backed companies have significantly lower value-added ratios compared to non-BA-backed companies until 
year 2, but the difference is not significant thereafter. 
7 We thank an anonymous referee for this comment. 
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advise caution in using the market failure argument as grounds for defending government programmes in 
the informal risk capital market but also point to the long-term potential of these companies. A longer time 
period is needed to see whether the positive evolution continues. 
 
2.6.3 Contribution to economic development  
 
The ultimate goal of the Flemish government was to stimulate regional economic growth and development 
(Van Rompuy, 1999). Important indicators hereof are job creation, taxes and value adding (Lerner, 1999; 
European Commission, 2001).  
 
Table 2.2: Evaluation of the contribution to economic development 
 
 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
(1) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and non-angel-backed companies, we used Wilcoxon rank tests 
(2) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and the other angel-backed companies, we used Mann-Whitney tests 
 
 
The BAN-backed companies together added € 45.2 million in value from the year of angel participation 
onwards, or, € 73.2 million if extrapolated to all 55 BAN-backed companies. Each euro of government 
subsidies spent on the Flemish BANs generated an estimated € 85.39 in value added. The value added 
Variable  
(in 000 EUR) 
BAN-backed 
compared to: 
(1) Non-angel-backed 
companies 
(2) Angel-backed through 
another channel 
 Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N 
 
Taxes 
 
Year 0 3.82 7.51 11 22.09** 65.51 22 20.00** 31.89 12 
Year 2 0.63 5.80 8 21.28** 41.46 25 12.42** 24.14 19 
Year 3 9.67 25.24 12 17.36 24.03 25 28.83** 49.35 18 
 
Average yearly growth 
 
Value-added 73.78 144.41 30 -3.55** 146.54 33 148.00** 415.24 46 
Employees (FTE) 0.52 1.57 21 -0.18** 1.82 16 2.74** 8.60 44 
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grows on average with € 73 782 per year in BAN-backed companies, which is significantly more than in 
non-angel-backed companies. BAN-backed companies hence perform better than comparable non-angel-
backed companies. 
 
The BAN-backed companies in the sample paid € 547 000 in taxes in a five-year period starting from the 
year of the angel participation. Extrapolated, all BAN-backed companies paid € 884 852 in taxes. Hence it 
is estimated that each euro of government money spent on the BANs generated a direct return of € 1.03 in 
taxes. Following their J-curve type evolution, the BAN-backed companies initially pay significantly fewer 
taxes than the non-angel-backed companies, but this difference disappears after three years when the taxes 
paid by BAN-backed companies increase dramatically (Table 2.2). It is further remarkable that they pay 
significantly less tax in year 3 than companies that received angel financing through another channel. 
 
Finally, job creation is assessed using several measures. Employee growth is significantly higher in BAN-
backed companies than in non-angel-backed companies and comparable with that in companies that 
received angel financing through another channel. If extrapolated, all BAN-backed companies together 
employ 495 people, representing 102 net jobs created (187 jobs created minus 85 jobs destroyed) from the 
year of angel participation until the last available year. Each BAN-backed company has created 1.85 jobs 
on average over the observation period (corresponding to an average yearly growth of 0.52 FTE), 
representing a subsidy of € 8 399 per job created. As there is a high probability that BAN-backed 
companies would not have existed without the BANs due to financing constraints, the most positive view 
is to consider all current 495 jobs as being additional. The subsidy per job created or retained is then 
€ 1 731. This compares with an estimated subsidy per job of € 1 515 under the DTI initiative in the UK, 
€ 4 000 under the European business incubators initiative and € 3 100 under the Structural Fund initiative 
in Belgium (Harrison and Mason, 1996b; European Commission, 2002).  
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The Flemish government thus succeeds in stimulating economic development and growth through the 
subsidization of BANs. BAN-backed companies generally contribute as much as companies that found 
angel financing without a BAN and significantly more than non-angel-backed companies in terms of 
value-added and job creation, although they do initially pay less taxes.  
 
2.6.4 Indirect effects  
 
An exhaustive evaluation of a government initiative needs to go beyond its direct effects (Harrison and 
Mason, 1996b; Lerner, 1999). In addition to matching entrepreneurs and investors, BANs may provide 
other benefits, such as raising the awareness and legitimacy of angel financing, coaching and educating 
investors and entrepreneurs (which for the latter also entails feedback from potential investors) and 
enabling entrepreneurs to raise further financing thanks to angel financing, both at the time of the initial 
investment and later (Harrison and Mason, 1996a;b; Lumme et al., 1998). Although hard to quantify, each 
of these impacts is briefly discussed. 
 
Due to the anonymity preference of angel investors and the fact that entrepreneurs often have incomplete 
knowledge of financing sources (Van Auken, 2001; Paul et al., 2003), raising the awareness of potential 
market participants is an important task of BANs. Interviewed entrepreneurs and angel investors agree that 
BANs have conducted a considerable awareness campaign on the existence and merits of angel financing. 
Furthermore, both parties considered this task to be important. 
 
Additionally, BANs can coach entrepreneurs on writing a business plan or presenting themselves to 
potential investors. If angel investors are not the most appropriate funding source, BANs can refer 
entrepreneurs to other, more suitable investors. The feedback provided by the angel investors themselves 
may also be important. Even if entrepreneurs do not find an investor, they might strengthen their 
opportunity based on feedback received from the angel investors to which they talked. Education and 
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training is a related task. BANs often provide specialized courses to investors and entrepreneurs on issues 
as negotiation, taxation or valuation. Based on the interviews, we found that entrepreneurs praise the 
BANs for their education and coaching. Although angel investors consider the BANs to perform rather 
well in educating entrepreneurs, they suggest more emphasis on educating angel investors although they 
do not consider this to be a critical task.  
 
A final indirect effect is the fact that angel funding might enable entrepreneurs to raise additional 
financing, both at the time of angel financing and thereafter (Harrison and Mason, 1996b). Cumming 
(2007) interprets the ability of companies to raise follow-on funding even as an indirect indication of 
entrepreneurial success, especially if they have not come to full fruition. Ten BAN-backed companies 
raised on average € 243 518 from angel investors not connected to a BAN and € 233 313 from other 
sources at the time of the angel investment. More particularly, four raised money from a bank, four from 
the government (subsidies), one from 3Fs (family, friends and fools), one from venture capitalists and one 
from other companies. In comparison, companies benefiting from the DTI initiative raised € 298 516 at 
the time of angel funding (Harrison and Mason, 1996b). While Flemish BAN-backed companies raised 
somewhat less than their UK colleagues, this confirms the satisfactory performance of the Flemish 
companies. 
 
Further, 61% of the entrepreneurs state that the angel financing had a positive impact on follow-on 
financing. Fourteen companies were able to raise follow-on bank financing, two venture capital financing 
and four raised financing through other channels such as government subsidies. On average, they raised 
another € 365 000 following angel financing. According to Harrison and Mason (1996b), one quarter of 
the companies should be able to attract at least 50% of the original amount as follow-on financing. The 
Flemish BAN-backed companies performed well as one quarter of the BAN-backed companies were able 
to raise 168% of the original amount. This yields further positive evidence of potential future value 
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creation (Cumming, 2007).  These results suggest that the Flemish BANs, in addition to their direct 
effects, also generate important positive indirect effects. 
 
2.7 Discussion  
 
Designing a successful programme that addresses failures in the risk capital market without crowding out 
the private sector is not easy. International evidence shows that countries such as Israel, Australia and the 
USA have implemented successful programmes supporting the venture capital market (Cumming, 2007). 
The goal of the present study is to evaluate whether one type of government intervention in the informal 
risk capital market, namely the subsidization of BANs, is warranted. We first assessed whether the 
subsidies have reached their goals of reducing the financing problems of value-creating entrepreneurial 
companies and, by doing so, stimulating economic development and growth. Second, we assessed whether 
this intervention was based on correct assumptions. Government intervention in the risk capital market is 
usually based on the perception of a market failure. Therefore, we evaluated whether there is a failure in 
the angel market, i.e. whether there are value-creating companies that face financing problems caused by 
information problems or R&D spillovers. We further assessed some indirect effects. 
 
Based on quantitative and qualitative data, we find clear evidence of BANs reducing information and 
financing problems of entrepreneurial companies. BANs finance particularly young companies with high 
financial risk in high-technology industries. These companies are most prone to information asymmetries 
and financial constraints. Moreover, entrepreneurs and angel investors state that they would not have 
known each other without BANs. The programme is additive: it increases the supply of funds to 
entrepreneurial companies, rather than crowding out the private sector. Further, these companies do 
contribute to economic development and growth. In this sense, the Flemish government programme is a 
success as its goals are reached. At this point in time it is hard to assess whether the supported companies 
create value in the long-term. In the short-term, they seem to destroy value, but there is an upward trend in 
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value adding and profitability in the last years of the analysis, what might point to these companies just 
needing more time to deploy their resources in the most effective way. The fact that most companies are 
able to raise significant amounts of follow-on funding is a further indication of future potential. The 
Flemish BAN programme produced positive indirect effects and compares well to the UK‟s DTI initiative, 
our only benchmark (Harrison and Mason, 1996b). In conclusion, the fact that this programme has 
successfully reached its goals, created many positive indirect effects and that the companies supported 
through this programme hold value-creating potential, lead us to conclude that public BAN support is 
justified. However, in order to make this tentative conclusion more robust, a longer-term evaluation of 
BAN-backed companies‟ value creation is indispensable.  
 
Our study has several contributions. First, we contribute to the academic evaluation literature, as there is a 
scarcity of government programmes‟ evaluations. We contribute methodologically by combining 
quantitative and qualitative data. Second, our study dispels the popular view that BANs attract the worst-
quality deals. Companies that seek funding through BANs are not riskier, nor do they grow less or have 
lower returns post-investment compared with companies that seek funding from angel investors through 
another channel. Finally, it confirms the BANs‟ role in reducing information and financing problems in 
the informal risk capital market.  
 
Our study has a number of limitations. First, we mainly focused on the subsidies‟ direct effects. As the 
externalities of the subsidies are hard to quantify, the impact of the government subsidies might be 
underestimated. Second, some positive outcomes, such as total angel money invested due to the existence 
of a BAN, might be overestimated. Third, one could argue that publicly funded BANs should be compared 
with non-publicly funded ones. As the ultimate goal of BAN subsidies is to reduce information and 
financing problems of entrepreneurial companies, we consider it more relevant to study the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the measure. Moreover, none of the Flemish BANs would have existed without the 
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subsidies: these were instrumental in setting up and running the BANs. There were (and still are) no 
Belgian BANs operating without subsidies (EBAN, 2005a).  
 
We propose some suggestions for further research. As most BAN investments are young, we were only 
able to assess their post-investment performance up to four years. In order to assess the value creation of 
BAN-backed companies, longer-term analyses are essential. Another interesting avenue for further 
research is to compare companies that had financing alternatives before the angel investment with those 
without. In order to understand better the impact of direct BAN subsidies, it is interesting to compare this 
approach with other approaches used to stimulate angel investments, e.g. tax reliefs or co-investment 
schemes. Given the relatively young nature of the latter programmes, we leave this as an avenue for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Conflict between Angel Investors and Entrepreneurs: Perception, 
reality and impact on innovation* 
 
Veroniek Collewaert 
 
Ghent University, Department of Accounting and Corporate Finance 
 
Abstract 
Intragroup conflict has often been mentioned as one of the key processes affecting team and 
organizational innovation. However, there has been a lot of debate as to whether or not conflict is 
beneficial to innovation. This paper aims to shed new light on this relationship by taking the debate to the 
intersubgroup level and studying the impact of intersubgroup task, relationship and process conflicts on 
innovation. Furthermore, this study extends the conflict contingency framework, according to which the 
effects of these three types of conflict on innovation vary depending on moderating influences. Going 
back to early conflict theory, a distinction is made between perceived and actual incompatibilities or 
perceived and actual conflict respectively. This paper aims to show that both are equally important in that 
the latter can alter the former‟s effects. Using teams consisting of entrepreneurs and angel investors, the 
empirical results reveal that perceived task and relationship conflict, but not process conflict, negatively 
impact a company‟s innovation output. However, perceived conflict‟s negative effect can be reduced by 
low levels of actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs. 
 
* This paper is accepted for publication in the Best Paper Proceedings of the 2009 Academy of Management 
Meeting (Chicago, IL). A more extensive version of this paper is accepted for publication in 2008 Frontiers of 
Entrepreneurship Research (Babson College) and benefited from presentation at the 2008 Babson College 
Entrepreneurship Research Conference (Chapel Hill, NC). I acknowledge financial support from the Fund for 
Scientific Research – Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen) and would like to thank Bart Clarysse, Pamela Hinds, Karen Jehn, 
Sophie Manigart and Annaleena Parhankangas for their feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Being a source of competitive advantage, innovation has usually been positively related to a company‟s 
performance, growth and success (Damanpour, 1991; Cho and Pucik, 2005). Innovation is defined as “the 
intentional introduction and application within a role, group or organization of ideas, processes, products 
or procedures, new to the relevant unit of adoption, designed to significantly benefit the individual, group, 
organization or wider society” (West and Farr, 1990, p. 9). As such it captures the team‟s or organization‟s 
capacity to deal with change (West and Sacramento, 2006). Despite the vast amount of literature on 
innovation‟s antecedents and moderators (Damanpour, 1991; Anderson et al., 2004), much remains to be 
learned about the processes whereby teams and companies become innovative (De Dreu, 2006, p. 83-84). 
One of those key processes is conflict between team members (De Dreu, 2006; West and Sacramento, 
2006). Whether conflicts are beneficial or detrimental to a team‟s or organization‟s innovation has been 
the subject of much debate. Some scholars argue that intragroup disagreements increase information 
sharing, critical evaluation and assessment of alternatives, diverse opinions and perspectives, which 
should lead to more creativity and innovation (Baron, 1984; Nemeth, 1995; De Dreu and West, 2001). 
Others, however, argue that conflicts consume cognitive resources and produce stress and tension, 
blocking information handling and processing, both of which reduce the capacity for creative thinking and 
hence impede innovation (Walton, 1969; Pelled, 1996; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003).  
 
This paper aims to shed more light on the conflict-innovation relationship in two ways. First, most of the 
current literature has focused on conflict between team members, i.e. intragroup conflict (Bezrukova and 
Jehn, 2008). United by a superordinate goal, team members are dependent on each other and work 
together to reach that particular goal (Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). Many teams however consist of 
subgroups striving for their own specific sub-goals, which is an aspect of teams that has generally been 
overlooked until recently (Li and Hambrick, 2005; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). This paper aims to address 
this gap in the conflict literature by looking into intersubgroup conflict‟s impact on innovation and, as 
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such, shed new light on the conflict-innovation relationship. Second, in response to many inconclusive 
empirical results concerning conflict‟s impact, conflict researchers have proposed a contingency 
perspective (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003a; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). According to this approach, 
conflict‟s impact on innovation should vary depending on two elements: (i) the type of conflict and (ii) 
moderating influences (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003a; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). Building on this line of 
research, this paper seeks to better identify the conditions under which conflict is beneficial or detrimental 
to innovation. In order to do so, a distinction is made between actual and perceived incompatibilities or 
perceived and actual conflict. According to the early conflict theorists, perceived and actual 
incompatibilities can vary independently (Deutsch, 1973; Thomas, 1976). Despite this, conflict studies 
over the years have come to focus on the former and ignored the latter. This study aims to contribute to 
conflict theory by showing that perceived and actual incompatibilities are equally important when 
studying conflict and thus both should be taken into account. More specifically, this paper analyses the 
impact of different types of perceived intersubgroup conflict on innovation, considering the moderating 
role of actual conflict.  
 
To examine conflict‟s impact on organizational innovation, I conduct my study in the context of angel-
financed entrepreneurial companies. Operating in a highly dynamic and volatile environment, innovation 
is of the utmost importance to these companies. Due to R&D externalities, informational opaqueness and 
low levels of collateral, they are constrained from access to bank financing and public capital markets 
(Berger and Udell, 1998; Lerner, 1998). As such, angel investors are generally considered the primary 
early-stage financing source for entrepreneurial companies. Further, using the angel investor-entrepreneur 
relationship as a research context offers the benefit of providing a real-life setting in which to study the 
impact of actual incompatibilities. More specifically, this study focuses on a particular form of actual 
conflict prevalent in this relationship, i.e. actual goal incompatibilities (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Cable 
and Shane, 1997). As for venture capitalists, a cooperative working relationship between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs is of crucial importance to the portfolio company‟s success (Cable and Shane, 1997; 
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Wijbenga and van Witteloostuijn, 2006). Previous research has indicated though that the post-investment 
relationship between external investors and entrepreneurs is prone to conflict instead and, as such, 
cooperation is far from self-evident (Higashide and Birley, 2002; Parhankangas and Landström, 2006; 
Yitshaki, 2008). Notwithstanding the importance of cooperation between external investors and 
entrepreneurs, research into the “dark side” of their relationship is still lacking (Parhankangas and 
Landström, 2006, p. 775). As such this study contributes to the entrepreneurial finance literature by 
broadening our understanding of how the internal dynamics between external investors and entrepreneurs 
impact their portfolio company‟s level of innovation.  
 
The paper will proceed as follows: firstly, the arguments underlying conceptualizing angel investors and 
entrepreneurs as teams will be discussed. Thereafter hypotheses will be developed regarding the impact of 
perceived conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on the portfolio company‟s innovation as 
well as the moderating effect of actual conflicts between these parties (see figure 3.1 for a conceptual 
model). Finally, I will describe the method, present the findings and discuss these results, the contributions 
and limitations. 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived conflict 
Task conflict 
Relationship conflict 
Process conflict 
Innovation 
Actual conflict 
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3.2 Angel investors and entrepreneurs as a team 
 
In an average angel-backed company, angel investors and entrepreneurs are dependent on each other in 
that they make a deal to exchange the angel investor‟s human, social and financial capital for the 
opportunity or potential to make financial gains (Prowse, 1998; Yitshaki, 2008). In order for the portfolio 
company to survive and grow, the entrepreneurs need the angel investor‟s capital, although the degree to 
which can differ from company to company (Freear et al., 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998). Similarly, the 
angel investors, whose degree of active participation in a portfolio company can also vary, need the 
entrepreneurs to run and manage the company in a way that will maximize their financial gain (Mason, 
2006). In other words, both parties have their own particular role to play, but both roles are vitally and 
equally important to the company‟s final success and growth. Being interdependent individuals who work 
together to reach important, mutual goals, angel investors and entrepreneurs thus fulfil the definition of a 
team (De Dreu et al., 1999; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). However, regardless of their mutual overarching 
goal of value creation, angel investors and entrepreneurs could have different sub-goals. For instance, 
entrepreneurs could see their company as a life-long commitment, whereas investors could only want to 
maximize their short-term returns (DeTienne, 2008; Yitshaki, 2008). This, in turn, will lead to potentially 
divergent views between investors and entrepreneurs as to what the best way to run the company or to 
allocate resources is (Cable and Shane, 1997). As such, the distinction between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs forms a natural divide between these two parties. Therefore, in what follows, conflict 
between angel investors and entrepreneurs refers to intersubgroup conflict (Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008).  
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3.3 Theory and hypotheses 
 
3.3.1 Perceived Conflict and Innovation 
 
According to the most recent literature on intragroup conflict, conflict is defined as “perceived 
incompatibilities or discrepant views among the parties involved” (Jehn and Bendersky, 2003, p. 189). A 
distinction is made between three different types of conflict, namely task, relationship and process 
conflicts (Jehn, 1995; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). 
 
In this study, task conflicts are perceived disagreements or differences in opinion between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs about the task performed (based on Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Bezrukova and Jehn, 
2008). For instance, being key strategic decision agents, angel investors and entrepreneurs can perceive to 
disagree on what tasks to be carried out or what short-term and long-term objectives to set for the 
company (e.g. what products to develop, what markets to enter and what growth strategy to pursue). Task 
conflicts are generally considered to play a crucial role in the innovation process (De Dreu, 2006; Song et 
al., 2006), hence making it the most relevant type of conflict to study in relation to this outcome. 
Intragroup task conflict and its impact on innovation have been the subject of much debate, with some 
scholars suggesting a positive effect (see, for instance, Gebert et al., 2006; Matsuo, 2006), others a 
negative effect (e.g. Lovelace et al., 2001) and others a curvilinear effect (De Dreu, 2006; Kratzer et al., 
2006).  
 
I argue that angel investors and entrepreneurs having task-related disagreements could be thought of as 
warring factions within a team (Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). Rather than investors and entrepreneurs being 
different individuals contributing different ideas about the task at hand, their interaction will have a higher 
chance of turning into a competitive game with each faction trying to reach their own sub-goals 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Amason, 1996; Brewer and Miller, 1996; LaBianca et al., 1998). This in 
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turn will increase the level of distrust, use of politics and cognitive barriers between the team members 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Baba et al., 2004; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). Consequently, 
information sharing between angel investors and entrepreneurs will be blocked and both parties‟ cognitive 
ability to process new or complex information will decrease. A truly open and creative debate between 
these subgroups will thus become less likely (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007), which should make it more 
difficult for both parties to come up with innovative solutions and will redirect their attention away from 
maximizing the innovative potential of the company and its products to the disagreement at hand (Walton, 
1969; Lovelace et al., 2001). In other words, task conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
should thus be associated with lower levels of organizational innovation. 
 
The second most frequently studied type of conflict, relationship conflict, is defined as “an awareness of 
interpersonal incompatibilities” between angel investors and entrepreneurs (based on Jehn and Mannix 
2001, p. 238; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). Compared to task-related disagreements, relationship conflicts 
have been the subject of much less debate as research has consistently produced negative results (see, for 
instance, Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997; De Dreu and Van Vianen, 2001; Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Bayazit 
and Mannix, 2003; De Dreu and Weingart, 2003b). Following this traditional view, I expect underlying 
tensions, personal frictions or anger between angel investors and entrepreneurs to increase feelings of 
cynicism, avoidance and anxiety, interfere with their ability to handle new or complex information, to 
decrease cooperation and to absorb time and energy necessary for creativity (Jehn, 1995; Amason, 1996; 
Pelled 1996, Jehn, 1997; Matsuo, 2006). Relationship conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
are thus likely to hamper innovation. 
  
Thirdly, process conflicts are defined as an awareness of controversies between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs about aspects of how task accomplishment will proceed (based on Jehn and Mannix 2001, p. 
239; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). Process-related disagreements between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs could include what roles the investor should take in the company (should (s)he act as a 
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sounding board, take on a seat in the board of directors or take on a part-time or full-time job in the 
company), how the decision power should be distributed between investors and entrepreneurs, how 
financial and human resources should be allocated and which control and monitoring mechanisms should 
be introduced in the company. The few studies that have looked into this type of conflict, have generally 
suggested it to have a negative effect (see, for instance, Jehn, 1997; Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Hinds and 
Bailey, 2003; Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003; Passos and Caetano, 2005), including on innovation 
(Matsuo, 2006). As with the other two types of conflict, I argue process conflicts between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs to detract from the portfolio company‟s level of innovation due to the negative emotions 
(frustration, confusion) it produces (Hinds and Bailey, 2003; Greer and Jehn, 2007), redirection of 
attention and cognitive capacity away from the task (Hinds and Bailey, 2003; Matsuo, 2006) and an 
increased probability of transforming into the other two types of conflict (Greer, Jehn, & Mannix, 2008). 
In conclusion, the hypotheses for the effects of perceived conflicts between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs on the portfolio company‟s innovation are thus: 
 
H1a: Higher levels of perceived task conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will reduce the 
company’s innovation level. 
H1b: Higher levels of perceived relationship conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will 
reduce the company’s innovation level. 
H1c: Higher levels of perceived process conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will reduce 
the company’s innovation level. 
 
3.3.2 Actual Conflict and Innovation 
 
As can be deducted from the discussion above, the definition of intragroup conflict and hence 
intersubgroup conflict has converged on a conceptualization where the emphasis is on the perception, 
experience or awareness of incompatibilities or frustrations (e.g. Thomas, 1992; Jehn, 1995; Janssen et 
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al., 1999; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). As the early conflict theorists noticed though, there is more to 
conflict than just perception. More specifically, they emphasized that perceived incompatibilities do not 
necessarily reflect actual incompatibilities, nor will actual incompatibilities necessarily be perceived as 
such (Deutsch, 1973; Thomas, 1976; Fisher, 1998). While perceived incompatibilities could be thought of 
as overt conflict, actual incompatibilities could be thought of as latent or actual conflict (Pondy, 1967; 
Schmidt and Kochan, 1972). In this paper, I argue that perceived conflicts between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs have a much stronger negative effect in the presence of actual conflicts than without actual 
conflicts. More specifically, I focus on a particular type of actual conflict prevalent in the angel investor-
entrepreneur relationship, i.e. actual goal incompatibilities. Based on agency theory, the existence of 
incompatible goals between external investors and entrepreneurs is likely (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; 
Cable and Shane, 1997). For example the entrepreneur might conceive the company as a lifestyle 
company versus the investor conceiving it as a short-term, high-growth investment. As such this setting 
provides us with a natural real-life setting to study the impact of actual incompatibilities, as opposed to 
much of the organizational behaviour literature where these incompatibilities need to be manipulated 
through experiments (see, for instance, Mannes, 2008).  
 
Distinguishing this approach from the cooperative and competitive goal approach to conflict (e.g. 
Tjosvold, 1998; Chen et al., 2005; Yi-Feng et al., 2008) is again that the latter completely revolves around 
perception. More specifically, based on Deutsch (1973), these researchers state that when team members 
perceive their goals to be cooperatively or positively dependent on each other, conflicts can have 
constructive effects on team effectiveness through increased mutual trust, positive attitudes towards other 
team members and open-minded debate (Deutsch, 1973; Tjosvold, 1998). Perceptions of competitively or 
negatively linked goals on the other hand will lead to the opposite. In this paper, however, the focus is on 
actual incompatible or competitive goals, not the perception thereof. 
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As actual conflicts are associated with less cooperative behaviour and less problem-solving (Deutsch, 
1973; Fisher, 1998), the negative emotions, frustrations, competitive tactics and disabled information 
sharing process associated with perceived conflicts, regardless the type, should be intensified in teams 
where actual goal incompatibilities between angel investors and entrepreneurs are high. Arguments from 
the entrepreneurial finance literature would point in the same direction. Research in the venture capital 
area has namely shown that higher goal incompatibility between investors and entrepreneurs will increase 
the frequency of interaction between these parties as to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior (Sapienza 
and Gupta, 1994). Frequent communication should ensure that both parties are exercising enough effort to 
perform their respective tasks as well as avoiding any dishonest or fraudulent behaviour (Parhankangas 
and Landström, 2006). However, although meant as a solution, contact theory suggests that increased 
interaction and communication can have an adverse effect in that it may also heighten the salience of any 
present conflicts, regardless of whether these discussions relate to the task performed, the process towards 
task accomplishment or personality clashes (Brewer and Miller, 1996; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). As 
conflicts become more salient, conflicting parties become more aware of their existence, which will 
exacerbate their negative effects (Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). Further, venture capital research also 
showed that incongruent goals not only increase the frequency of interaction between investors and 
entrepreneurs, but simultaneously reduce the quality of the information and knowledge exchanged during 
that interaction (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). When angel investors and entrepreneurs start to withhold 
crucial information, they obstruct the information-sharing process, both in terms of width and breadth. 
This is however the condition sine qua non for task conflicts to have a beneficial effect on creativity and 
decision-making (Amason, 1996; De Dreu, 2006). As such, highly incompatible goals and the resulting 
disabled information-sharing process will only serve to further strengthen task conflict‟s negative main 
effect on the portfolio company‟s innovation. Hence, I hypothesize the following:  
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H2a: The negative effects of task conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on the portfolio 
company’s innovation will be stronger in companies where actual conflicts between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs are higher (rather than lower). 
H2b: The negative effects of relationship conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on the 
portfolio company’s innovation will be stronger in companies where actual conflicts between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs are higher (rather than lower). 
H2c: The negative effects of process conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on the portfolio 
company’s innovation will be stronger in companies where actual conflicts between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs are higher (rather than lower). 
 
3.4 Method 
 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
 
The hypotheses are tested based on a dataset of Belgian angel-backed companies. In order to reduce 
sample selection bias and obtain the most representative sample possible, 20 different Belgian data 
sources were used to identify angel-backed companies, including a random directory of start-ups, deal lists 
of angel networks, GEM data8, directories of high-technology companies9, media articles, incubators and 
snowballing. This way a list of 305 potential angel-backed companies was constructed, who were 
contacted by phone during the summer of 2007 in order to identify whether or not they fulfilled the 
conditions of the research. These conditions were (1) at least one angel investor needed to be a member of 
the Board of Directors, this to ensure a minimum threshold of active participation in strategic decision-
making in their portfolio company and (2) the company had to have received angel financing between 
January 2003 and August 2006. The latter condition was imposed in order to avoid the exit period. This 
                                                            
8 During the data collection process for the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor in Belgium, an additional question was 
asked to respondents as to whether or not they had made investments that were not family- or friend-related. 
9 For more details on this dataset see Heirman and Clarysse (2005). 
62 
 
was deemed important as conflict‟s effects can change as teams are approaching the end of their 
relationship (Jehn and Mannix, 2001). Further, it is also general practice in venture capital research to 
avoid recall and survival bias (Higashide and Birley, 2002; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). This resulted 
in 107 (potentially) eligible companies of which 49 agreed to participate and 58 that either did not want to 
participate (18) or I was unable to contact (40).  
 
Data were collected via two instruments: (1) all independent and moderating variables were gathered 
through questionnaires and (2) information on the dependent variable was gathered through the 
companies‟ financial accounts (see below). Prior to sending out the questionnaires, pilot tests were 
conducted to ensure the adequacy of the measures in this untraditional setting (one with an expert in the 
field, three with angel investors and four with entrepreneurs). Pilot tests averaged little more than over one 
hour. Based on the results slight modifications were made to the non-financial items included in the actual 
conflict scale to better fit the angel setting. Considering the team approach adopted in this paper, 
responses were sought from all entrepreneurial team members and angel investors who had a seat on the 
Board of Directors. An entrepreneurial team is defined as those individuals who, at the time of the study, 
each had an equity stake and were actively involved or played a key role in strategic decision making 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Forbes et al., 2006). Angel investors are defined as external individual investors 
who invest some of their own wealth in unlisted companies in exchange for shares and who have no 
family or friend connection to the entrepreneurs (Mason, 2006). When parties agreed to participate, 
questionnaires were e-mailed either directly to the team members concerned or, in some cases, through the 
CEO when angel investors preferred to remain anonymous. When necessary, follow-up phone calls were 
performed. On the first page of the questionnaire, it was clearly stated who should be considered to belong 
to the angel investors or the entrepreneurial team. Individuals were then asked to fill in the questionnaire 
referring to these two definitions. Using a team member response rate criterion of 50% (as in Ensley et al., 
2002; Mooney et al., 2007) and the condition that at least one response was needed from the angel 
investor side and one from the entrepreneurs‟ side, I obtained a final sample of 28 teams. Although small, 
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this sample size is not unusual in team research (e.g. Wageman, 2001; Raver and Gelfand, 2005; De Dreu 
2006). The teams averaged 3 members (s.d. = 0.92, range = 2–5) and represented 75 individual responses 
(of which 35 angel investors and 40 entrepreneurs). Analyses revealed no substantial differences between 
early and late respondents regarding the primary variables of interest, suggesting that the risk of non-
response bias is limited (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). 
 
3.4.2 Measures 
 
Innovation was measured as the ratio of the amount of intangible assets to total assets in 2007, using the 
companies‟ financial accounts. As this section mainly contains R&D expenses, patents and licenses, it is 
generally considered a good proxy of a company‟s innovative activity (Francis and Smith, 1998; 
Bounfour, 2005).  
 
The three types of perceived conflict were all measured using three items (see Appendix A for exact 
wording of the items). Task and relationship conflict were measured using the revised version by Pearson 
et al. (2002) of Jehn‟s intragroup conflict scale (Jehn, 1995), adapted to the intersubgroup level. On a scale 
from 1 (= none) to 5 (= a great deal), respondents were asked to rate how many disagreements concerning 
task-related issues and how much personal friction and tension there had been between the angel investors 
and the entrepreneurs. Process conflict was measured using the scale from Jehn and Mannix (2001), also 
adapted to the intersubgroup level. Using the same Likert-type scale as for the other two types of conflict, 
respondents were asked to rate the amount of disagreements between the angel investors and 
entrepreneurs regarding resource allocation and task responsibilities. All Cronbach‟s alpha values 
indicated good reliability (0.94, 0.97 and 0.88 respectively).10  
                                                            
10 Individual item reliability was also checked, with item loadings exceeding a 0.7 threshold considered reliable 
(Hulland, 1999). This condition holds for all items except for one process conflict item, i.e. the resource allocation 
item (a result similar to the Jehn and Mannix, 2001). As this particular loading does not drop below 0.5 and the scale 
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Actual conflict was measured as the degree of goal incongruence based on Sapienza and Gupta (1994). 
First, respondents were asked to allocate 200 points across 11 objectives (6 financial and 5 non-financial 
criteria) and this according to their individual perception of each of these criteria‟s importance to the 
achievement of the short-term financial goals of Venture X. Second, they were asked how much emphasis 
should be given to financial and non-financial goals respectively (percentage). For each criterion a 
weighted score was then calculated. Illustration: new product development (NPD) is a non-financial 
criterion. Assume the respondent allocated 20 out of 100 non-financial points to this criterion and, in 
general, thinks that non-financial goals should be given 80% emphasis, then the weighted score for NPD 
would equal 20x0.80. Sapienza and Gupta (1994) then proceed by calculating the absolute differences 
between the weighted scores of the venture capitalist and the CEO and then summing these differences 
across criteria. As, in this study, the focus is on the degree of goal incongruence between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs, one step was added. First, the average of the weighted scores per criterion was 
calculated for the two subgroups (i.e. angel investors and the entrepreneurs) separately.  Only then I 
proceed in the same way as Sapienza and Gupta (1994), i.e. taking the absolute differences of the average 
weighted scores of the angel investors and entrepreneurs within the same company and summing them 
across criteria. 
 
Based on previous conflict-innovation studies, I controlled for team size and industry (Lovelace et al., 
2001; De Dreu, 2006). Team size was a sum of the number of entrepreneurs and angel investors on the 
Board of Directors.  Industry was operationalised as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the 
company belonged to the services industry and 0 otherwise. Following venture capital literature, I also 
controlled for investment stage. This was measured as a dummy variable, taking the value 1 when the first 
angel investment of interest was a seed or start-up investment and 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
was previously validated I keep it in the model. As a robustness check, process conflict analyses were rerun without 
this item, but this did not alter the results. 
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3.4.3 Scale Validation and Data Aggregation 
 
First, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess the validity of the conflict scales. This 
yielded a model that fitted the data adequately (χ² (24) = 52.31, χ²/df = 2.18, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.93, 
SRMR = 0.06). Item loadings were as proposed and significant, which provides sufficient evidence for 
discriminant validity. Second, data needed to be aggregated to the team level as intersubgroup conflict is 
in fact a specific type of intragroup conflict. In other words, while the unit of analysis is the intersubgroup 
level, this statistically translates to aggregation to the team level. In order to check whether aggregation to 
this level was appropriate, the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) and within-group agreement index 
was calculated (James et al., 1984; Lindell et al., 1999; Klein and Kozlowski, 2000). For all three conflict 
constructs, the ICC is significant (p < 0.01) and the median Rwg(J) values exceed the 0.7 threshold (0.94 for 
both task and relationship conflict and 0.95 for process conflict), which justifies aggregation. Median 
Rwg(J) values were also calculated based on a triangular and moderately skewed distribution instead of the 
generally used uniform null distribution to account for potential response biases (LeBreton and Senter, 
2008). These values also all exceed the 0.7 threshold, thus confirming adequate within-group agreement 
for aggregation.  
 
3.5 Results 
 
3.5.1 Sample description  
 
On average, the companies included in this sample are five years old, have ten employees, received their 
angel financing three years ago and have three angel investors who currently own 36% of the shares. Eight 
companies received seed financing, another 8 start-up financing and 12 investments were later-stage 
investments. These companies are mainly active in the services industry, among which fifteen operating in 
the ICT industry and another five in research and development. The average angel investor is 48 years old, 
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has 12 years of entrepreneurial experience and has founded four companies. The average entrepreneur is 
41 years old, has 6 years of entrepreneurial experience and has founded 2 companies. 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 28) 
 
 
 
 
† < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  
 
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the means11, standard deviations and zero-order correlations between 
the variables included in the model. The portfolio company‟s innovation and both task and relationship 
conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs are marginally significant, negatively correlated. 
Although also negative and thus in the predicted direction, the correlation between process conflicts and 
innovation is insignificant. Noteworthy are the very high and significant correlation coefficients between 
all three conflict constructs, as in tradition with previous conflict studies (see, for instance, Peterson and 
Behfar, 2003; Parayitam and Dooley, 2007). In order to reduce the risk of multicollinearity and taking into 
account the rather small sample size, separate models for each of the three conflict types were run.  
 
3.5.2 Main Analyses 
 
All hypotheses were tested using partial least squares (PLS) path analysis with bootstrapping, which is a 
type of variance-based structural equation modelling (Chin et al., 2003), using SmartPLS software (Ringle 
                                                            
11 The mean value for actual conflict is 66.23 (st.dev. 22.32). As a point of comparison, the average degree of goal 
incongruence between venture capitalists and CEOs in the study by Sapienza and Gupta (1994) was substantially 
higher, i.e. 93.92 (st.dev. 31.61). 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Team size 3.46 0.92 -      
2. Task conflict 2.31 0.79 .03 -**     
3. Relationship conflict 1.84 0.92 -.09 .82** -    
4. Process conflict 1.68 0.59 -.08 .76** .79** -   
5. Actual conflict 66.23 22.32 -.21 -.10** -.06** .14 -  
6. Innovation 0.23 0.24 -.18 -.32†* -.33†* -.15 .13 - 
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et al., 2005). This technique, developed by Wold (1974), is well-fit for testing structural models with small 
sample sizes and situations where distributional assumptions might not hold (e.g. Milberg et al., 2000; 
Weingart et al., 2008). As the proposed measurement model was adequate – assessed through the 
individual item reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity – the second step could be 
executed, i.e. testing and interpreting the relevant path coefficients (Hulland, 1999). The results of these 
analyses with standardized coefficients are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: PLS path analysis results for intangible assets ratio (N = 28) 
† < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects)  
 
First, a restricted model holding only the control variables was run. This control model shows that early-
stage companies with smaller teams from service industries are the more innovative ones. Of the control 
variables, however, only investment stage has a significant positive effect throughout most models. 
Together these control variables explain 13% of the variance in innovation across the companies in the 
sample. 
 
In order to test hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c the three perceived conflict constructs were then added 
separately. The results show that perceived task conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs have 
 
 
Control 
model 
H1a H1b H1c H2a H2b H2c 
Control variables        
Team size -0.28† -0.27* -0.30* -0.32† -0.48** -0.36** -0.33** 
Early stage 0.32† 0.36* 0.32† 0.38† 0.39** 0.26** 0.44** 
Services industry 0.02† -0.07* 0.00* 0.01† 0.05** 0.05** -0.05** 
Predictor variables        
Task conflict  -0.41*   -0.36**   
Relationship conflict   -0.34*   -0.29†*  
Process conflict    -0.29†   -0.29** 
Actual conflict     -0.10** -0.28** 0.04** 
Task conflict x Actual conflict     -0.56**   
Relationship conflict x Actual conflict      -0.57**  
Process conflict x Actual conflict       -0.48** 
R² 0.13† 0.29* 0.25* 0.21† 0.56** 0.48** 0.43** 
Effect size  0.23* 0.16* 0.10† 0.61** 0.44** 0.39** 
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a significant, negative impact on the portfolio company‟s innovation (p ≤ .05). Although R² has the same 
meaning as it has in traditional analysis techniques (which here equals 0.29), model fit cannot be 
evaluated in the same way. One measure suggested is to calculate the effect size, f², of including the 
“new” variable(s). This is calculated as (R² full model – R² restricted model) / (1 – R² full model). Values 
of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 can be viewed as benchmark values for, respectively, small, medium and large 
effects (Cohen, 1988). Adding task conflict to the control model has an effect size of 0.23. In other words, 
task-related disagreements between angel investors and entrepreneurs have a medium negative effect on 
the portfolio company‟s innovation. Taken together, this thus provides strong support for hypothesis 1a.  
 
Similarly, relationship conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs also negatively impact the 
portfolio company‟s innovation (p ≤ .05), supporting hypothesis 1b. This type of conflict has a somewhat 
smaller impact on the company‟s innovation compared to task-related disagreements between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs, indicated by both the lower R² (equalling 0.25 for the relationship conflict 
model) and the lower medium effect size (0.16). Although process conflict‟s sign is in the predicted 
negative direction, it does not significantly impact the company‟s innovation. Hypothesis 1c is thus not 
supported.  
 
Next, the moderating impact of actual conflicts between conflicting parties is tested. To do so, separate 
models were run for the three types of conflict. All three models immediately include both the main and 
interaction effects as the research interest is not in actual conflict‟s main effect, but in its moderating 
effect. Hence assessing the hypotheses through hierarchical regression analysis, entering the main effects 
in step 1 and the interaction terms in step 2 would suffer from misspecification bias (e.g. Echambadi et al., 
2006)12. When adding the interaction term for perceived task conflict and actual conflict, the results show 
that task conflict‟s negative main effect remains robust. Furthermore, the interaction term is also 
                                                            
12 However, as also recommended by Echambadi et al. (2006), the respective main effects are controlled for in the 
moderated models. 
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significant (p ≤ .01). Calculating the effect size confirms the importance of including actual conflict as a 
moderator, considering its inclusion has a large effect on explaining the portfolio company‟s innovation 
(f² = 0.61). The interaction effect was plotted based on Aiken and West (1991) for high (1 standard 
deviation above the mean) and low (1 standard deviation below the mean) levels of actual conflict.  
 
Figure 3.2: Innovation as a function of task conflict and actual conflict 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, the results were as expected in that task conflict‟s negative effect on innovation is 
significantly exacerbated when actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs are high. Low 
actual conflicts on the other hand, do provide the constructive environment necessary for task-related 
discussions to have a positive impact. Taken together, this thus provides strong support for hypothesis 2a.  
 
Results for relationship and process conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs are comparable. 
The results from the main effects model remain the same, i.e. significant and negative for relationship 
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conflicts and insignificant for process conflict, and in both cases the interaction effect of actual conflict is 
confirmed. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 serve to further clarify these interaction effects.  
 
Figure 3.3: Innovation as a function of 
relationship conflict and actual conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Innovation as a function of process 
conflict and actual conflict 
 
 
Both graphs show that when goals between angel investors and entrepreneurs are highly aligned or actual 
conflicts are low, both types of conflict‟s now have a positive impact on the portfolio company‟s 
innovation. The opposite holds for when goals are highly diverged. Taken together, these results thus 
provide strong support for both hypotheses 2b and 2c. When comparing all three figures, it is noteworthy 
that, under conditions of high levels of actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs, all 
three types of conflicts have a similar negative effect on innovation. Under conditions of low actual 
conflicts though, task conflicts, surprisingly, have the weakest positive effect of the three conflict types.  
 
3.5.3 Robustness Checks 
 
Considering the rather small sample size it was deemed appropriate to conduct several robustness checks. 
First, one year after the first round of data collection, i.e. in May 2008, all 28 companies were contacted 
again to collect new data on their innovativeness (based on the perception of both entrepreneurs and angel 
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investors following Lovelace et al., 2001).13 The correlation between the two innovation measures, i.e. the 
intangible assets ratio and the innovativeness scale, was 0.44 (p < .05), which provides additional support 
for their validity. PLS path analyses results for the new innovativeness measure revealed the same 
significant interaction effects of actual conflict as well as the significant negative main effect for task 
conflict. Relationship conflict‟s main effect was not confirmed, which would indicate that this type of 
conflict is a less important antecedent of innovation compared to task conflict. Considering the 
longitudinal nature of the data, this further addresses the potential problem with the cross-sectional nature 
of the previous analyses and thus provides more support for the proposed causal inferences.  
 
Second, all models were rerun using standard OLS regressions instead of PLS path analysis. In all models, 
the results from the hypothesized effects were generally the same, but those retrieved from PLS were more 
conservative. Third, in this paper teams were defined as containing two or more individuals (Salas et al., 
1992; DeShon et al., 2004; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). However, some scholars argue that dyads have 
different dynamics than teams made up of three or more members (see, for instance, Levine and 
Moreland, 1990; Pelled, 1996). Combined with team size rarely having a significant impact in all models, 
all analyses were rerun including a dyad dummy (taking the value of 1 if there was only 1 angel investor 
and 1 entrepreneur and 0 otherwise). Again the results remained robust. Fourth, one might also argue that 
angel investors and entrepreneurs differ in many more aspects than just goal incongruencies. Therefore, 
following the same procedure as used for calculating the goal incompatibility measure, differences 
between angel investors and entrepreneurs within the same team were calculated in terms of their age, 
education level, number of education years, number of years entrepreneurial experience, number of years 
managerial experience, tenure in the company, growth aspirations and percentage ownership in the 
company (one for each difference variable separately). None of these difference variables were correlated 
                                                            
13 Complete responses were received for all 28 companies (equaling 76 respondents). Innovativeness was measured 
using a 4-item scale, asking respondents to rate the current performance of the company, compared to its 
competitors, on a 7-point Likert scale. The items referred to the company‟s adaptability to changes, the 
innovativeness of its product/service, the number of innovations or new ideas introduced and its overall technical 
performance (Cronbach‟s alpha: 0.80). Correlation with the same scale measured in 2007 was 0.89 (p < .001). 
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with the degree of goal incongruence between angel investors and entrepreneurs. As such, other 
differences between angel investors and entrepreneurs within a team do not drive the results of this study 
and thus cannot provide an alternative explanation.14  
 
3.6 Discussion 
 
Previous research has suggested conflict to be one of the key processes influencing team and 
organizational innovation (Lovelace et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2005; De Dreu, 2006). The goal of this paper 
was to study perceived conflict‟s impact on innovation from a contingency point of view, by testing the 
moderating impact of actual conflicts. In order to do so I used teams of entrepreneurs and angel investors 
as (1) innovation is of crucial importance to the entrepreneurial companies they belong to, (2) cooperation 
is assumed to be key to the success of their partnership and (3) these teams provide a natural real-life 
example of what actual conflicts could entail, i.e. actual goal incompatibilities between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs. The findings reveal a significant, negative effect of perceived task and relationship 
conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on the portfolio company‟s innovation, but they do 
not for process conflict. Furthermore, confirming the use of a contingency perspective when studying 
conflict, the results also show that low levels of actual conflicts between conflicting parties can reduce 
conflict‟s negative effects, regardless of whether these conflicts are related to the task at hand, personal 
frustration or resource allocation and task responsibilities issues. As such this paper has several 
contributions. 
 
First, this study contributes to the conflict literature by shedding more light on how conflict impacts 
innovation. Whether task conflicts are beneficial or detrimental to a team‟s or company‟s innovation has 
been the subject of much debate (see, for instance, Lovelace et al., 2001; De Dreu, 2006; Matsuo, 2006, 
                                                            
14 The highest correlation was 0.21 (p = 0.30) between degree of goal incongruence and difference in education level 
of angel investors and entrepreneurs. 
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who all propose a different effect for task conflict). Taking this discussion from the intragroup to the 
intersubgroup level, subgroups being angel investors and entrepreneurs, allows bringing a novel 
perspective to this debate. More specifically, the negative results support the view that in cases of task-
related disagreements, conflicting subgroups could be seen as warring factions engaging in competitive 
tactics and politics, leading to distrust and hampered cognitive processing. This could point to a potential 
shortcoming of previous intragroup conflict studies and provide a potential explanation for the mixed 
results in conflict-innovation studies. More particularly, most conflict studies have focused on conflict 
within teams, teams being two or more individuals united by a superordinate goal (Kozlowski and Ilgen, 
2006). What researchers have generally neglected is that having superordinate goals does not preclude the 
existence of subgoals and hence subgroups. Consistent with literature on demographic faultlines, these 
subgroups can have a substantial impact on the overarching teams‟ effectiveness (see, for instance, Li and 
Hambrick, 2005; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). Hence, when studying intragroup conflict, researchers might 
want to take into account the potentiality of existing subgroups within these teams as this could alter 
conflict‟s effects. Further, the results also provide support for relationship conflict‟s negative effect on 
innovation, due to negative emotions and limited cognitive processing ability, but not so for process 
conflict. Comparing the task and relationship conflict‟s models also confirms the prominent view in past 
conflict research that task conflict is the most relevant type of conflict to study in the innovation process 
(e.g. Song et al., 2006). Although relationship conflict‟s negative effect is in line with what has previously 
been found, some caution in interpreting these results is advised. There has been a surge in research 
showing that task conflicts can lead to relationship conflicts through misattributions and wrong 
interpretations, hence suggesting a mediating effect of relationship conflict on team performance 
outcomes instead of a main effect (e.g. Simons and Peterson, 2000; Mooney et al., 2007). Considering 
task conflict‟s overwhelming impact on innovation and it being very highly correlated to relationship 
conflict, this possibility cannot be ruled out in this study. In other words, the use of competitive tactics and 
politics in task conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs could trigger relationship conflicts 
between these two parties, hence explaining the latter‟s negative effect on innovation (i.e. as a mediator of 
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task conflict‟s negative effect). Unfortunately, due to the small sample size, I was unable to test this 
potential mediation effect. The lack of support for process conflict‟s negative main effect on innovation 
may be specific to the research setting. Namely, due to adverse selection and moral hazard risks, angel 
investors and entrepreneurs conduct severe pre-investment discussions concerning the specifics of their 
partnership, i.e. company valuation, ownership distribution, voting rights, resource allocation, role 
definitions etc. Hence many of the topics that could potentially lead to process conflicts could already 
have been discussed prior to or at the time of investment, hence resulting in lower levels of and less 
variation in process conflict compared to more traditional teams. Descriptive statistics (see Table 3.1, 
mean and standard deviation) in this study would seem to corroborate this alternative explanation. 
 
Second, this study also contributes to the conflict literature by extending the conflict contingency 
framework to include a new moderator, i.e. actual conflicts between conflicting parties. Regardless of the 
approach taken, conflict studies over the past 20 years have been united by their common focus on 
perceptions or awareness (Thomas, 1992; Jehn, 1995; Pelled, 1996; Tjosvold, 1998; Chen et al., 2005; 
Mooney et al., 2007). Perceived incompatibilities however do not necessarily reflect actual ones, nor are 
actual incompatibilities necessarily perceived as such. This paper responds to this neglect of actual 
incompatibilities or actual conflict, as it was labelled by early conflict theorists (such as Deutsch, 1973; 
Thomas, 1976). The results in this paper support the view that actual conflicts should be considered 
equally important as perceived conflicts in that the former can substantially alter the latter‟s effects. 
Specifically, the results are consistent with the argument that actual conflicts will exacerbate the negative 
emotions, frustrations, competitive tactics and disabled information-sharing process associated with 
perceived conflicts. In other words, low levels of actual conflicts could provide the positive and 
psychologically safe environment team members need to vent their opinions in an open debate, resulting 
in more creative decisions. Although results are equally strong for all three types of conflict, the plots 
would seem to suggest that low levels of actual conflict would be most beneficial for relationship and 
process conflict. This would be in line with task conflict‟s key role in the innovation process. Namely, as 
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task conflict‟s negative main effect on innovation is the strongest of all three, it could also be the hardest 
one to turn around. 
 
3.7 Limitations, Future Research and Implications 
 
This study is not without its limitations. First, it was conducted based on a rather small sample (n=28). 
Although sample sizes of this magnitude are not unusual in team research and the partial least squares 
technique is apt to deal with small sample sizes, it still makes the results less stable and furthermore 
precludes the possibility of testing a more elaborate contingency framework. In addition to testing the 
simultaneous influence of several moderators at once, a larger sample size would also allow us to test 
some of the mediating mechanisms described in this paper. Second, I used a rather non-traditional team 
relationship as the research setting. Although well-fit to the goal of this study, i.e. intersubgroup conflict 
and the role of actual incompatibilities, it would be interesting to see whether the results would also hold 
in other more traditional teams with subgroups. Extending this line of thought, future research might also 
want to look into intersubgroup conflict‟s effects on other outcomes than innovation. Third, all data were 
collected from Belgian angel-backed companies, which might limit the generalizability of the findings. 
This might be particularly true for the UK and US as the angel financing market in those countries is 
highly developed. However, the Belgian setting is quite similar to other continental European countries 
where results are thus more likely to hold. Finally, as the focus of this paper is on intersubgroup conflict, 
intrasubgroup dynamics or dynamics within the subgroups of angel investors and entrepreneurs are not 
taken into account. One might argue that intrasubgroup conflicts could prohibit angel investors and 
entrepreneurs to form coalitions within their factions, could reduce their intrasubgroup cohesion and 
reduce intersubgroup biases. It could thus lessen the negative effects of their intersubgroup conflicts. 
Although this effect cannot be formally contradicted, our data indicate that angel investors and 
entrepreneurs face less conflict within their subgroups than between their subgroups. Hence, the effect of 
these intrasubgroup dynamics on the results of this study should be limited. 
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Considering the substantial impact actual conflicts have in this study, future research on this particular 
topic is warranted. For instance, one could look into potential main effects of actual conflicts, other forms 
of actual conflict than the one studied here (i.e. actual goal incompatibilities) and when and how actual 
conflicts are activated. Finally, confirming the view that cooperation is of crucial importance to the 
success of the partnership between angel investors and entrepreneurs, raises the question whether these 
results would also hold for that other important category of external investors, i.e. venture capitalists.  
 
Finally, this paper also has several practical implications. First, this paper suggests that both angel 
investors and entrepreneurs should pay careful attention to any conflicts that might arise between them as 
these, regardless the topic, can substantially (and negatively) impact their company‟s innovation. As 
lowers level of innovation are generally associated with lower levels of performance (Matsuo, 2006; Cho 
and Pucik, 2005), conflicts should thus not be neglected or ignored. This is not to say that conflict between 
angel investors and entrepreneurs can never be constructive, quite the contrary. Thorough due diligence 
pre-investment, contracting and post-investment monitoring have generally been appraised as these 
processes reduce adverse selection and moral hazard risks in the relationship between external investors 
and entrepreneurs. Given the importance of goal congruence in creating a constructive team environment, 
pre-investment due diligence becomes even more important in order to ensure careful goal alignment 
between these two parties. Having highly aligned goals from the very start will substantially increase the 
chances of a cooperative and harmonious relationship between these two parties.  
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3.9 Appendix A: Items for task, process and relationship conflict 
 
1.Task conflict 
a. How many disagreements over different ideas have there been between the entrepreneurial 
team and the angel investor(s)? 
b. How many differences about the content of decisions have the angel investor(s) and the 
entrepreneurial team had to work through? 
c. How many differences of opinion have there been between the angel investor(s) and the 
entrepreneurial team? 
2. Process conflict 
a. How often have there been disagreements between the angel investor(s) and the 
entrepreneurial team about who should do what? 
b. How much conflict has there been between the angel investor(s) and the entrepreneurial team 
about task responsibilities? 
c. How often have the angel investor(s) and the entrepreneurial team disagreed about resource 
allocation? 
3. Relationship conflict 
a. How much tension has there been between the angel investor(s) and the entrepreneurial team 
during decisions? 
b. How much personal friction has there been between the angel investor(s) and the 
entrepreneurial team during decisions? 
c. How much anger has there been between the angel investor(s) and the entrepreneurial team? 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Angel investors and entrepreneurs: do they live happily ever after?* 
 
Veroniek Collewaert 
 
Ghent University, Department of Accounting and Corporate Finance 
 
Abstract 
Despite the importance of exit to both entrepreneurs and investors, little to nothing is known about what 
factors drive their intentions to voluntarily remain with their businesses. Adopting a socio-psychological 
perspective, this paper is among the first to shed new light on this crucial phase of the entrepreneur- 
investor relationship by examining the impact of conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on 
their intentions to remain. Furthermore, this study extends conflict theory by hypothesizing that both 
perceived and actual incompatibilities have a unique and significant role to play in the conflict process and 
hence both should be incorporated in a conflict definition. Adopting a multilevel approach and using data 
gathered in two locations, Belgium and California, the findings reveal a significant negative impact on 
intentions to remain of both perceived and actual task conflicts, but not so for relationship conflicts. 
Finally, the better angel investors and entrepreneurs perceive their ventures to be performing, the longer 
they want to stay. This effect is stronger though for angel investors than entrepreneurs, whom want to 
remain longer with their companies anyway. 
 
* This paper is accepted for publication in the Best Paper Proceedings of the 2009 Academy of Management 
Meeting (Chicago, IL) and accepted for presentation at the 2009 Babson College Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference (Boston, MA). I acknowledge financial support from the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders (FWO-
Vlaanderen) and the Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School as well as research support from the Stanford 
Graduate School of Business in the form of a visiting fellowship. I would also like to thank Sophie Manigart, Bart 
Clarysse and Annaleena Parhankangas for their feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Despite the importance of exit for both investors and entrepreneurs, little is known as to what factors 
influence their intentions and motivations to voluntarily remain with or leave their businesses (Wincent et 
al., 2008; DeTienne, 2008). With regard to external investors, previous exit studies have focused on 
investor preferences in terms of how (e.g. IPO, acquisition, trade sale) and when to exit, determinants of 
these exit preferences and the role of contracts in the exit decision (see, for instance, Amit et al., 1998; 
Mason and Harrison, 2002; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Smith, 2005; Hellmann, 2006). None of them 
have looked into intentions to exit though, nor approached this decision from a socio-psychological point 
of view. Entrepreneurial exit has received even less attention in the entrepreneurship literature. Only 
recently have some researchers acknowledged the importance of this phase in the entrepreneurial life 
cycle, not only to the entrepreneur, but also the firm, industry and economy at large (DeTienne and 
Cardon, 2007; DeTienne, 2008; Wincent et al., 2008). Furthermore, intentions to remain or leave have 
been shown to be important predictors of actual turnover or exit (O‟Reilly et al., 1991; Westerman and 
Cyr, 2004; Leroy et al., 2007), making this an outcome of vital importance. This paper hence aims to 
contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by providing a deeper insight into some of the factors 
potentially influencing investors‟ and entrepreneurs‟ intentions to remain with their ventures. 
 
In order to so, this paper will adopt a conflict theory lens on the post-investment relationship between 
angel investors and entrepreneurs. Over the past decade, researchers, practitioners and policy-makers have 
increasingly come to recognize the importance of angel investors as the primary early-stage financing 
source for entrepreneurial companies, among which renowned examples such as Google, Amazon.com 
and Twitter. Sohl (2005) estimated that 227 000 US angel investors invested $ 23.1 billion in 49 500 
companies in 2005, compared to venture capitalists investing only $ 21.7 billion in 2 939 companies 
(PWC et al., 2006). For both venture capitalists and angel investors, a cooperative working relationship 
with the entrepreneurs of their respective portfolio companies is of crucial importance to the latter‟s 
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success (Cable and Shane, 1997; Wijbenga and van Witteloostuijn, 2006). Unfortunately though, previous 
research has indicated that this particular relationship is rather prone to conflict instead and, as such, 
cooperation is far from self-evident (Higashide and Birley, 2002; Parhankangas and Landström, 2006; 
Yitshaki, 2008). Despite this, there is still a lack of studies looking into the “dark side” of the relationship 
between external investors and entrepreneurs (Parhankangas and Landström, 2006, p. 775). Given 
conflict‟s omnipresence in the angel investor-entrepreneur relationship, there is an increasing need to 
understand how conflicts between these two parties affect their relationship.  
 
In this study, I will focus on how conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs impact their intent 
to remain (invested) in the company. More specifically, building on conflict theory, I contend that 
perceived task and relationship conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will negatively impact 
their intention to stay with the company. Further, I also theorize that, in addition to perceived conflicts, 
actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will negatively impact both parties‟ turnover 
intentions. As such, this paper adds to conflict theory by joining in on the debate on how to define conflict 
(Tjosvold, 2007; Mannes, 2008). Over the past decade conflict researchers have generally conceptualized 
and measured conflict as perceived task-related or interpersonal incompatibilities (Jehn, 1995; Jehn et al., 
1997; Jehn and Mannix, 2001; De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). With this paper I propose to broaden this 
definition of conflict to also incorporate actual incompatibilities or conflicts, which is how conflict was 
initially thought of by the very early conflict theorists (Pondy, 1967; Deutsch, 1973). This is more than 
merely a measurement issue as both aspects of conflict, i.e. perceived and actual incompatibilities, can 
vary independently and thus should not be considered equivalent. Theorizing conflict to consist of both a 
perceptual and an actual component could provide an alternative lens on why conflict studies over the 
years have produced so many mixed findings (e.g. Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; De Dreu and Weingart, 
2003; De Dreu, 2006) and can reunite researchers debating on whether conflict in teams and organizations 
should be stimulated or avoided all together (Tjosvold, 2007; De Dreu, 2008).  Furthermore, by focusing 
on intentions to remain, this paper also addresses the call of several conflict researchers to pay more 
88 
 
attention to softer, morale-related outcomes instead of harder, performance-related outcomes (Jehn and 
Bendersky, 2003; De Dreu and Beersma, 2005). 
 
Finally, in addition to theoretical contributions to the conflict and entrepreneurship literature, this study 
also has a methodological contribution. Theory underlying conflicts between team members is mostly 
focused on the group level (Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). When linking this to 
inherent individual-level outcomes such as satisfaction, intent to remain and well-being, conflict 
researchers up to now have generally adopted either one of two approaches: (1) they aggregate the 
individual-level data to the group level and hence analyse the relation between, for instance, conflict and 
group satisfaction (e.g. DeChurch and Marks, 2001; Homan et al., 2007) or (2) they disaggregate group-
level conflict data and hence analyse the relation between conflict as perceived by the individual team 
member and their individual-level satisfaction (e.g. Jehn et al., 1999; Duffy et al., 2000; Guerra et al., 
2005). By adopting a multi-level perspective to explaining individual-level variation in intent to remain 
(invested) in the company based on group-level conflict, this paper hence addresses this gap in the conflict 
literature, which so far has largely neglected the inherent multi-level nature of intragroup conflict (De 
Dreu and Gelfand, 2007; Korsgaard et al., 2008). Further, it also adds to the entrepreneurship literature by 
addressing the call for more multilevel research (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001; Ireland et al., 2005).  
 
The paper will proceed as follows: first, hypotheses will be developed regarding the impact of perceived 
and actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on their intentions to remain (see figure 4.1 
for the conceptual model). Then I will describe the method, present the findings and discuss the results, 
contributions and limitations. 
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual model 
a
Level 1 refers to the individual level, level 2 to the team level (i.e. angel investors and entrepreneurs together). 
 
 
4.2 Angel investors and entrepreneurs as a team 
 
In an average angel-backed company, angel investors and entrepreneurs are dependent on each other in 
that they make a deal to exchange the angel investor‟s human, social and financial capital for the 
opportunity or potential to make financial gains (Prowse, 1998; Yitshaki, 2008). In order for the portfolio 
company to survive and grow, the entrepreneurs need the angel investor‟s capital, although the degree to 
which can differ from company to company (Freear et al., 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998). Similarly, the 
angel investors, whose degree of active participation in a portfolio company can also vary, need the 
entrepreneurs to run and manage the company in a way that will maximize their financial gain (Mason, 
2006). In other words, both parties have their own particular role to play, but both roles are vitally and 
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equally important to the company‟s final success and growth. Being interdependent individuals who work 
together to reach important, mutual goals, angel investors and entrepreneurs are thus teams (De Dreu et 
al., 1999; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). Although united by the overarching goal of value creation, angel 
investors and entrepreneurs could have different sub-goals. For instance, entrepreneurs could see their 
company as a life-long commitment, whereas investors could only want to maximize their short-term 
returns (DeTienne, 2008; Yitshaki, 2008). This, in turn, will lead to potentially rather divergent views 
between investors and entrepreneurs as to what the best way to run the company or to allocate resources is 
(Cable and Shane, 1997). As such, the distinction between angel investors and entrepreneurs forms a 
natural divide between these two parties. Therefore, when referring to conflict between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs, one is in fact, strictu senso, talking about intersubgroup conflict instead of intragroup 
conflict (Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). In what follows, whenever necessary, this distinction is made 
explicit. 
 
4.3 Theory and hypotheses 
 
4.3.1 Differences between angel investors and entrepreneurs in intent to remain 
 
Before delving into the conflict literature, potential differences between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
in terms of their intention to remain are investigated. Angel investors, like venture capitalists, are 
generally assumed to want to exit from their portfolio companies at the same time or earlier than the 
respective entrepreneurs, this as exit represents their main harvesting opportunity (see, for instance, 
Berger and Udell, 1998; Black and Gilson, 1998; Mason and Harrison, 2002; Schwienbacher, 2008). 
Research has shown that angel investors, on average, prefer to exit their portfolio companies between 4 to 
7 years after the initial investment (Mason and Harrison, 2002; Freear et al., 2002). Similar research on 
(voluntary) entrepreneurial exits is scarce (DeTienne, 2008), which, in fact, means that there is no real 
benchmark to compare the investor numbers on preferred time-to-exit to. In other words, although 
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entrepreneurs wanting to outstay their investors represents one of the key assumptions in many 
entrepreneurial finance papers, no research to date has actually explicitly tested this assumption. 
Furthermore, counterarguments to this assumption could be made as well. For instance, angel investors, 
often having been entrepreneurs themselves, are known to be rather patient investors compared to venture 
capitalists with some not necessarily wanting to exit at all (Mason, 2006). Entrepreneurship literature has 
also often showed that there is no such thing as “the entrepreneur”. The various types of entrepreneurs 
(e.g. life-style, serial, habitual) could all differ in terms of how long they would like to remain in control 
of their company (e.g. Stewart et al., 1999; Westhead et al., 2005). Adopting the conservative point of 
view from the entrepreneurial finance literature, I however hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Entrepreneurs will have a higher intent to remain with their company than their angel investors. 
 
4.3.2 Perceived conflict and intent to remain 
 
According to the most recent literature on intragroup conflict, conflict is defined as “perceived 
incompatibilities or discrepant views among the parties involved” (Jehn and Bendersky, 2003, p. 189). 
Following this view, the impact of two particular types of conflict between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs is studied, namely relationship conflicts and task conflicts (Jehn, 1995; De Dreu and 
Weingart, 2003).  
 
Relationship conflicts are defined as “an awareness of interpersonal incompatibilities” between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs (based on Jehn and Mannix, 2001, p. 238; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). This 
type of conflict is generally seen as dysfunctional, regardless of the outcome studied (De Dreu and 
Weingart, 2003; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). For instance, focused on the relationship between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, Higashide and Birley (2002) showed that relationship conflicts (as perceived 
by the venture capitalist) negatively affected the perceived performance of their portfolio companies. With 
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regard to more emotional-laden outcomes, relationship conflict‟s personal nature may cause feelings of 
anger, stress, anxiety, avoidance, suspicion, cynicism and animosity on both the angel investors‟ and 
entrepreneurs‟ side (Jehn, 1995; Amason, 1996; Pelled, 1996; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; Bayazit and 
Mannix, 2003). Further, a substantive amount of literature has shown that individuals do not generally 
enjoy the experience of personal attacks, criticisms and the along-going bad feelings. As such, relationship 
conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will lead to a general feeling of dissatisfaction and 
thus decrease their intention to remain with the company (Jehn, 1995; Jehn et al., 1999; Jehn and 
Bendersky, 2003; Medina et al., 2005). Or, put differently: 
 
H2: Higher levels of relationship conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will decrease their 
intent to remain (invested) in the company. 
 
Task conflicts are defined as perceived disagreements or differences in opinion between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs (within the same company) about the task performed (based on Jehn and Mannix, 2001; 
Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). For instance, being key strategic decision agents, angel investors and 
entrepreneurs can perceive to disagree on what short-term and long-term objectives to set for the company 
(e.g. what products to develop, what markets to enter and what growth strategy to pursue). While 
relationship conflicts have consistently produced negative results, the effects of task-related disagreements 
have been the subject of a lot more debate in the conflict literature (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). The 
controversy concerning task conflict though revolves around its impact on performance-related outcomes 
and not morale-related outcomes (Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; De Dreu, 2006). In other words, regardless 
of how positive task-related disagreements between angel investors and entrepreneurs might be in terms of 
their impact on the team/company performance or decision quality/ innovativeness (for instance, Jehn, 
1995; Higashide and Birley, 2002; Matsuo, 2006), similar to relationship conflict they will also produce 
feelings of frustration, discomfort and tension (Ross, 1989; Jehn, 1995; Amason and Schweiger, 1997; 
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Jehn et al., 1997). Hence, perceived task-related disagreements between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
will also make both parties less satisfied and less inclined to stay in their conflictual partnership. Thus: 
 
H3: Higher levels of task conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will decrease their intent to 
remain (invested) in the company. 
 
4.3.3 Actual conflict and intent to remain 
 
As can be deducted from the discussion above, over the years, the definition of intragroup conflict has 
converged on a conceptualization where the emphasis is on the perception, experience or awareness of 
incompatibilities or frustrations, regardless of whether these relate to objectives, needs or desires (e.g. 
Thomas, 1992; Jehn, 1995; Janssen et al., 1999; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; Medina et al., 2005). What 
this literature has come to neglect though is that perceived incompatibilities do not necessarily reflect 
actual incompatibilities, nor will actual incompatibilities necessarily be perceived as such (Deutsch, 1973; 
Thomas, 1976; Fisher, 1998). While perceived incompatibilities could be thought of as overt conflict, 
actual incompatibilities could be thought of as latent or actual conflict (Pondy, 1967; Schmidt and 
Kochan, 1972). As opposed to the traditional conflict literature that has emphasized the former and 
ignored the latter, I propose that a definition of conflict should incorporate both components in that both 
can have a unique and significant impact on team effectiveness. 
 
As opposed to much organizational behavior literature that is experimental in nature (e.g. Mannes, 2008), 
the relationship between angel investors and entrepreneurs provides us with an excellent real-life setting 
of what these actual incompatibilities could include, namely goal incompatibilities15. Based on agency 
                                                            
15 Distinguishing this approach from the cooperative and competitive goal approach adopted by Tjosvold and his 
colleagues, is the fact that they define cooperative and competitive goals as the perception thereof. In other words, 
when team members perceive their goals to be positively or cooperatively linked, conflicts can be constructive to 
team effectiveness through increased mutual trust, positive attitudes towards other team members and open-minded 
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theory, the existence of incompatible goals between external investors and entrepreneurs is likely 
(Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Cable and Shane, 1997). For example, the entrepreneur might conceive the 
company as a lifestyle company versus the investor conceiving it as a short-term, high-growth investment. 
Both parties might try to conceal these actual objectives though, consciously or unconsciously, resulting in 
each of these parties operating under their own particular hidden agenda. If this were to be the case, the 
existence of actual goal incompatibilities between angel investors and entrepreneurs is not necessarily 
perceived as such. As perception and reality can vary independently from each other, perceived goal 
incompatibilities will also not necessarily reflect actual ones.  
 
I argue that, in addition to perceived conflicts, actual conflicts can also have an impact on team 
effectiveness. Previous research on goal incongruence between exchange partners for instance has 
associated this phenomenon with less cooperation, less positive feelings towards the partner (in this case, 
the investor or entrepreneur) and lower quality of information exchanged (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Si 
and Bruton, 2005; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). Furthermore, actual goal incompatibilities between 
angel investors and entrepreneurs will increase the likelihood of competitive tactics and will make 
problem-solving more difficult (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, 1998; Tjosvold, 1998). In other words, when angel 
investors and entrepreneurs truly and substantially differ in terms of the objectives they want to achieve, it 
will be a lot harder for them to find a compromise and forge a cooperative relationship. The hypothesis is: 
 
H4: Higher levels of actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs will decrease their intent 
to remain (invested) in the company. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
debate (Deutsch, 1973; Tjosvold, 1998). Perceptions of competitively or negatively linked goals on the other hand 
will lead to the opposite. 
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4.4 Method 
 
4.4.1 Data collection 
 
Data for this study were gathered in two locations, namely Continental Europe (Belgium) and USA 
(California). For the Belgian sample, 20 different data sources were used including a random directory of 
start-ups, deal lists of BA networks, GEM data16, directories of high-technology companies17, media 
articles, incubators and snowballing. This way a list of 305 Belgian potential angel-backed companies was 
constructed, who were telephoned during the summer of 2007 in order to identify whether or not they 
fulfilled the conditions of the research. These conditions were (1) at least one angel investor needed to be 
a member of the Board of Directors or actively involved in strategic decision-making in their portfolio 
company and (2) the company had to have received angel financing between January 2003 and August 
2006. The latter condition was imposed in order to avoid the exit period. This was deemed important as 
conflict‟s effects can change as teams are approaching the end of their relationship (Jehn and Mannix, 
2001). Further, it is also general practice in venture capital research to avoid recall and survival bias 
(Higashide and Birley, 2002; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). This resulted in 107 (potentially) eligible 
companies of which 49 agreed to participate and 58 that either did not want to participate (18) or I was 
unable to contact (40). For the Californian sample, the data sources included Zephyr, VentureXpert, 
Growthink and the members‟ or participants‟ lists from the Angel Capital Association, C21 BioVentures 
and the California Clean Tech Open competition. This resulted in a list of 1265 Californian potential 
angel-backed companies. Through e-mails and the use of a YouTube video in which the research project 
and the above-mentioned conditions were explained, this was reduced to 805 (potentially) eligible 
companies. Of these 805 companies 43 agreed to participate and 762 either did not want to participate (28) 
or I was unable to contact (734). 
                                                            
16 During the data collection process for the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor in Belgium, an additional question was 
asked to respondents as to whether or not they had made investments that were not family- or friend-related. 
17 For more details on this dataset see Heirman and Clarysse (2005). 
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Responses were sought from all entrepreneurial team members and angel investors who had a seat on the 
Board of Directors or were actively involved in the company. The entrepreneurial team was defined as 
those individuals who, at the time of the study, had an equity stake and were actively involved or played a 
key role in strategic decision making (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Forbes et al., 2006). The definition used for 
angel investors was external individual investors who invest some of their own wealth in unlisted 
companies in exchange for shares and who have no family or friend connection to the entrepreneurs 
(Mason, 2006). When parties agreed to participate, questionnaires were e-mailed either directly to the 
team members concerned or, in some cases, through the CEO when angel investors preferred to remain 
anonymous. When necessary, follow-up phone calls were performed. On the first page of the 
questionnaire, it was clearly stated who should be considered to belong to the angel investors or the 
entrepreneurial team. Individuals were then asked to fill in the questionnaire referring to these two 
definitions. Using a team member response rate criterion of 50% (e.g. Ensley et al., 2002; Mooney et al., 
2007) and the condition that at least one response was needed from the angel investor side and one from 
the entrepreneurs‟ side, a final sample was obtained of 28 Belgian teams (representing 75 individual 
responses) and 26 Californian teams (representing 62 individual responses)18. Analyses revealed no 
substantial differences between early and late respondents regarding the primary variables of interest, 
indicating that non-response bias should be limited (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). 
 
Hypotheses were tested using hierarchical linear modelling (Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002). As the 
number of higher-level units (i.e. teams) was rather small in both locations separately it was deemed 
desirable to combine them into one larger sample. In order to do so a multigroup confirmatory factor 
analysis was run to check for measurement invariance (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Cheung and 
Rensvold, 2002). The goodness-of-fit indices suggested by Hu and Bentler (1998) were all above the 
minimum values (CFI= 0.96, TLI=0.95, SRMR=0.06). As such, this provided support for combining the 
                                                            
18 See appendix 1 for some descriptive statistics on both samples. 
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Belgian and Californian samples into one larger sample, consisting of 54 teams and 137 individuals, of 
which 72 entrepreneurs and 65 angel investors. 
 
Since most of the variables used in the analyses were gathered through the same questionnaire, concerns 
around common method variance might arise. Several aspects were taken into account in designing the 
questionnaire as to reduce the risk of this potential bias, e.g. reverse scoring of items, use of variation in 
wording of items, use of different scaling anchors for the key variables and guaranteeing absolute 
anonymity to respondents (Lindell and Whitney, 2001; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Further, all variables were 
measured using scales which had been previously validated and shown to have good psychometric 
properties (see below). In addition to the design of this study, the Harman‟s single factor test also suggests 
common method bias may be limited (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Namely, the exploratory factor 
analysis resulted in a 3-factor solution, with the first factor accounting for only 34% of the total variance 
(and 31% and 13% for the second and third factor respectively). Finally, in order to account for potential 
negative affectivity bias the hypothesized models were rerun based on the Belgian sample
19
 while 
controlling for negative affect (Watson et al., 1988; Spector, 2006). This, however, did not change the 
results. Taken together, this suggests that the risk of common method bias is limited. 
 
4.4.2 Dependent and independent variable measures 
 
Intent to remain was measured at the individual level using two items based on O‟Reilly et al. (1991) and 
Brigham et al. (2007). The questions were “How long do you intend to remain with Venture X?” and “If 
you have your own way, will you be working for this organization three years from now?”. Both questions 
were slightly adapted for the angel investors (for the first item “remain invested in” was added and 
“working for this organization” in the second item was changed into “still be a shareholder”). The two 
                                                            
19 The scale for negative affect was only included in the questionnaire sent to the Belgian companies due to space 
restrictions in the U.S. questionnaire. 
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items were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from less than 1 year to more than 5 years for the first 
item and from definitely yes to definitely no for the second item. The second item was reverse scored such 
that higher scores indicated a higher intent to remain. For the final score the two items were averaged. The 
mean value across all respondents was 5.35 (st.dev. 1.50), indicating a negative skew (for further details 
see section on robustness checks). The Cronbach‟s alpha value was satisfactory (0.74). 
 
Both perceived conflict variables, task conflict and relationship conflict, were measured using three items 
for each. I used the revised version by Pearson et al. (2002) of Jehn‟s intragroup conflict scale (Jehn, 
1995), adapted to the intersubgroup level (Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). On a scale from 1 (= none) to 5 (= 
a great deal), respondents were asked to rate how many disagreements concerning task-related issues and 
how much personal friction and tension there had been between the angel investors and the entrepreneurs 
(see appendix 2 for specific items used). The mean value for task conflict was 2.24 (st.dev. 0.72) and 1.80 
(st.dev. 0.89) for relationship conflict. Both Cronbach‟s alpha values indicated excellent reliability (0.92 
and 0.93 respectively). In order to check whether aggregation to the team level was appropriate, the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) and within-group agreement index were calculated (James et al., 
1984; Klein and Kozlowski, 2000). Both ICCs are significant (p < 0.001) and the median Rwg(J) values for 
both constructs exceed the 0.7 threshold (0.94 for both task and relationship conflict), which thus justifies 
aggregation.20  
 
Actual conflict was measured as the degree of goal incongruence based on Sapienza and Gupta (1994). 
First, respondents were asked to allocate 200 points across 11 objectives (6 financial and 5 non-financial 
criteria) and this according to their individual perception of each of these criteria‟s importance to the 
achievement of the short-term financial goals of Venture X. Second, they were asked how much emphasis 
should be given to financial and non-financial goals respectively (percentage). For each criterion a 
                                                            
20 Median Rwg(J) values were also calculated based on a triangular and moderately skewed distribution instead of the 
generally used uniform null distribution (LeBreton and Senter, 2008). These values also all exceeded the 0.7 
threshold, thus confirming adequate within-group agreement for aggregation. 
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weighted score was then calculated. Illustration: new product development (NPD) is a non-financial 
criterion. Assume the respondent allocated 20 out of 100 non-financial points to this criterion and, in 
general, thinks that non-financial goals should be given 80% emphasis, then the weighted score for NPD 
would equal 20x0.80. Sapienza and Gupta (1994) then proceed by calculating the absolute differences 
between the weighted scores of the venture capitalist and the CEO and then summing these differences 
across criteria. As, in this study, the focus is on the degree of goal incongruence between angel investors 
and entrepreneurs, one step was added. First, the average of the weighted scores per criterion was 
calculated for the two subgroups (i.e. angel investors and the entrepreneurs) separately.  Only then I 
proceed in the same way as Sapienza and Gupta (1994), i.e. taking the absolute differences of the average 
weighted scores of the angel investors and entrepreneurs within the same company and summing them 
across criteria. The mean value was 76.57 (st.dev. 26.29). As a point of comparison, the average degree of 
goal incongruence between VCs and CEOs in the study by Sapienza and Gupta (1994) was somewhat 
higher, i.e. 93.92 (st.dev. 31.61). 
 
Finally, in order to test hypothesis 1, a dummy variable was created representing whether the individuals 
were angel investors (value 0) or entrepreneurs (value 1). 
 
4.4.3 Control variable measures 
 
Based on relevant turnover literature, controls were added for age and tenure of the respondent at the time 
of data collection (Jehn, 1995; Bayazit and Mannix, 2003; Giebels and Janssen, 2005). Tenure was 
deemed especially relevant as this could also be seen as a measure for time since investment for the angel 
investors. Finally, perceived performance (range 1-5) was also controlled for based on the measure used in 
several venture capital studies (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Higashide and Birley, 2002). This variable has 
often been suggested to positively influence the nature of the relationship between external investors and 
entrepreneurs as well as the former‟s intention to keep on investing in the company (e.g. De Clercq and 
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Sapienza, 2006). However, from a return point of view, it could also be argued that investors - from a 
certain level of high performance onwards - might want to exit the company and hence perceived 
performance could negatively affect their intentions to remain. Therefore, a curvilinear effect is also 
tested. Finally, as this effect might differ for angel investors compared to entrepreneurs, an interaction 
effect between perceived performance and the angel investor/entrepreneur dummy is also added. All 
control variables were measured at the individual level. 
 
4.5 Results 
 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the means, standard deviations and correlations between the individual-
level and team-level variables. I find significant, negative correlations between intent to remain and all 
conflict constructs, both perceived and actual, which provides some preliminary evidence in support of the 
hypotheses. Further, in tradition with previous conflict studies (see, for instance, Peterson and Behfar, 
2003; Parayitam and Dooley, 2007), the correlation between task and relationship conflict is very high 
(.85) and significant. Variance inflation factors suggest though that the threat of multicollinearity is 
limited (VIF of 3.4 for both perceived conflict constructs). Finally, correlations between both perceived 
conflict constructs and actual conflict are trivial, corroborating that these are indeed distinct concepts. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations
a 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
a Note: N = 137. Although the correlations between the group- and individual-level variables were calculated using 
N=137, the group-level scores were assigned down to the individuals within those groups. Thus, the effective sample 
size for task conflict, relationship conflict and actual conflict is 54. 
 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Age 46.58 10.09 -      
2. Tenure 2.98 2.06 .52** -     
3. Perceived Performance 3.07 0.77 .08** -.04 -    
4. Task conflict 2.24 0.72 -.10** -.10 -.21** -   
5. Relationship conflict 1.80 0.89 -.04** -.08 -.24** .85** -  
6. Actual conflict 76.58 26.29 -.01** -.04 -.12** -.01** .06** - 
7. Intent to remain 5.35 1.50 .04** .04 -.40** -.28** -.26** -.26** 
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As this study combines data from two levels, i.e. individuals nested within teams/companies, hypotheses 
were tested using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) (Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002). Applying standard 
OLS regression to multilevel data is inappropriate as it does not take into account the non-independence of 
observations, resulting in misestimated standard errors and increased type I and type II errors 
(Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002; Bliese and Hanges, 2004). As a first step it is generally advised to run a 
fully unconditional model (i.e. without any predictors) to check whether there is significant between-group 
variance in the outcome of interest and thus whether multilevel modeling is useful. Running this null 
model on intent to remain indicates that there is indeed significant between-group variation in intent to 
remain (τ00 = .85, χ² (53) = 132.83, p < .001). More particularly, 63% of the variation in intent to remain 
seems to be between individuals, while 37% of the variation is between teams. The hypotheses are tested 
following the standard process used for HLM, i.e. first build and test the lower-level unit or individual 
model and only then proceed to testing the higher-level unit or team model. In this study, this corresponds 
with first analyzing the model including the control variables, which are all at the individual level (model 
1). Then, hypothesis 1 is tested by adding the angel investor/entrepreneur dummy to the individual-level 
model (model 2). Finally, all other hypotheses are tested by modeling the intercept (model 3). The results 
for all models are shown in Table 4.2. 
  
The results for the control model (model 1) reveal a significant, positive impact of perceived performance, 
but do not confirm a curvilinear effect. In other words, it seems as though the higher angel investors and 
entrepreneurs perceive the performance of their (portfolio) company, the longer they intend to remain with 
that company. This effect remains highly significant throughout all models analyzed. Together the four 
control variables (perceived performance, its quadratic term, age and tenure) explain 16% of the between-
individual variance in intent to remain.  
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Table 4.2: Hierarchical linear modeling results for intention to remain – Fixed effects with robust 
standard errors
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects) 
aLevel 1, N = 137 individuals; Level 2, N = 54 companies 
bR² = proportion of within-group variance explained by level 1 predictors (Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002) 
cR² = proportion of between-group variance explained by level 2 predictors 
 
 
Model 2 indicates clear support for hypothesis 1, in that entrepreneurs do indeed intend to stay longer with 
their companies than their respective angel investors. Although it does not explain much incremental 
variance in intent to remain (1.31%), its impact remains highly significant throughout all models. 
Furthermore, perceived performance now has a marginally significant curvilinear main effect on intention 
to remain, which is moderated by the fact whether the individual is an angel investor or entrepreneur. 
Upon closer inspection of this interaction effect, it seems that whereas perceived performance has little or 
no impact on the entrepreneurs‟ intentions to remain, it has a curvilinear effect for the angel investors. In 
other words, angel investors‟ intention to remain with their ventures is lowest when they perceive their 
portfolio companies to perform either poorly or excellent.  
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual Level     
    
Age (γ10) -.02*** -.01*** -.01*** 
Tenure (γ20) -.05†** .01*** -.00*** 
Perceived Performance (γ30) 1.82*** 2.10*** 1.74*** 
Perceived Performance² ( γ40) -.18*** -.18†** -.14*** 
Investor/entrepreneur (γ50)  1.76*** 1.71*** 
Perceived performance² x Investor/entrepreneur ( γ60)  -.13*** -.13*** 
    
Team Level     
    
Task conflict (γ01)   -.54*** 
Relationship conflict (γ02)   .16*** 
Actual conflict (γ03)   -.01*** 
    
R² 0.16b** 0.17b** 0.42c*** 
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I then turn to testing the group-level effects (model 3). Perceived relationship conflicts (H2) and task 
conflicts (H3) between angel investors and entrepreneurs were hypothesized to have a significant negative 
impact on their intent to remain above and beyond the impact of the individual-level variables. While 
hypothesis 3 is clearly supported, hypothesis 2 is not. This is quite surprising given that previous conflict 
studies have generally either confirmed both effects on morale-related outcomes (e.g. Jehn, 1995) or at 
least relationship conflict‟s negative effect (e.g. Bayazit and Mannix, 2003). In this study though, 
relationship conflicts are not only less important in terms of their impact on intent to remain compared to 
task conflicts, but they are actually unimportant all together. Further, actual conflicts between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs, measured by degree of goal incongruence, were predicted to have a negative 
impact on their intention to remain (H4). Model 3 indicates significant support for this hypothesis. Adding 
these three team-level predictors to the control model explains 42% of the level-2 variance in intent to 
remain. In other words, of all the variation between angel-backed teams or companies in terms of their 
average intention to remain, 42% is explained by the degree of conflict, both perceived and actual, 
between the angel investors and entrepreneurs. 
 
Several additional analyses were performed to check the robustness of these results (numbers not shown in 
tables). First, in order to control for potential differences in conflict dynamics across countries, the models 
were rerun controlling for location (Belgium or California) by including a dummy variable in the level 2 
model. Not only was this variable insignificant, it also did not improve the fit of the model (as illustrated 
by a slightly higher level-2 residual variance) nor did it change the above-mentioned results. Second, the 
models were also rerun including more traditional control variables such as team size, company age and 
investment stage. There were no substantial changes in the hypothesized relations, nor did any of these 
control variables have a significant impact. Adding these variables, however, did increase the residual 
team-level variance, indicating a worse model fit. Third, two individuals had extreme values with regard 
to their tenure (12 and 15 years respectively), so analyses were redone without the two companies these 
individuals belonged to. Results remained the same. Fourth, as mentioned in the measures section, intent 
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to remain is a highly skewed variable. Therefore it was deemed appropriate to also run the models on a 
transformed, i.e. squared, version of the intent to remain variable. Again this did not alter the results and, 
moreover, this version of the model did not fulfill the level 1 homogeneity of variance-assumption. Fifth, 
considering the rather high correlation between task and relationship conflict, the final model was also run 
without relationship conflict. Although this resulted in a somewhat lower level-2 residual variance, it did 
not significantly alter the results. Sixth, in order to rule out a potential mediation effect for perceived 
performance, the procedure proposed by Zhang et al. (2008) to test for multilevel mediation was followed. 
Sobel tests indicated no significant mediation effects neither for perceived task and relationship conflict, 
nor actual conflict. Seventh, as several conflict studies focusing on individual-level outcomes have used 
individual perceptions of task and relationship conflict as predictors (e.g. Jehn, 1995; Jehn et al., 1999), 
models were rerun controlling for these variables at the individual level. Taking the impact of these 
variables into account, the team-level effects presented earlier remained robust. Finally, in order to shed 
some light on the rather untraditional results for the perceived conflict variables, a model was also built 
for individual-level satisfaction as this is traditionally strongly correlated with intent to remain (which is 
confirmed in this study: r = .27, p < .001). When running the satisfaction model, results were in line with 
what conflict literature predicts. Namely, relationship conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
had a significant negative impact on their individual-level satisfaction (p < .001), while task conflicts did 
not. Conflict theorists have generally classified intention to remain and satisfaction under the label 
“morale-related outcomes” and hence treated them as equivalents. The results in this study though would 
seem to indicate that while satisfaction of angel investors and entrepreneurs does fit this traditional box, 
intention to remain does not. The implications of this difference will be further elaborated upon in the 
discussion section.  
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4.6 Discussion 
 
Despite exit representing one of the key phases in the partnership between external investors and 
entrepreneurs, little to nothing is known about what affects both parties‟ intentions or motivations to 
remain with or leave their ventures (DeTienne, 2008). The goal of this paper is to study the impact of both 
perceived and actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs on both parties‟ intent to remain 
with their respective (portfolio) companies. The findings reveal a significant, negative effect of perceived 
and actual task conflict on the angel investor‟s and entrepreneur‟s intent to remain, but they do not 
confirm the hypothesized effect for perceived relationship conflict. This study also confirmed an 
assumption implicit to many entrepreneurial finance papers that, all else constant, entrepreneurs want to 
remain with their companies longer than their angel investors. As such this paper has several 
contributions. 
 
First, this study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by shedding more light on what drives angel 
investors and entrepreneurs to remain with their ventures. By supporting perceived and actual conflict‟s 
effect on intention to remain this study is one of the very first to apply and confirm the importance of a 
socio-psychological perspective on investors‟ and entrepreneurs‟ decision to remain with a company. Not 
only does this study corroborate the relevance of looking into the darker sides of the relationship between 
investors and entrepreneurs, it also reveals some interesting differences between these two parties. More 
specifically, the results show that entrepreneurs do indeed want to remain with their ventures longer than 
angel investors do, hence confirming an always implicit, but never tested assumption in the 
entrepreneurial finance literature. Furthermore, results also reveal that angel investors‟ intention to remain 
is highest when they perceive their ventures to perform moderately. For entrepreneurs on the other hand, 
perceived performance has little to no effect, which could be explained by their high levels of 
psychological ownership towards their ventures.  
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Second, this study contributes to the conflict literature by broadening the definition of conflict to 
incorporate both a perceptual and actual component. Regardless of the specific approach taken, conflict 
studies over the past 20 years have been united by their common focus on perceptions or awareness 
(Thomas, 1992; Jehn, 1995; Pelled, 1996; Tjosvold, 1998; Chen et al., 2005; Mooney et al., 2007). 
Perceived incompatibilities however do not necessarily reflect actual ones, nor are actual incompatibilities 
necessarily perceived as such. This paper thus responds to this neglect of actual incompatibilities or 
conflict, as it was labeled by early conflict theorists (such as Deutsch, 1973; Thomas, 1976). The findings 
of this study support the view that actual conflicts, through increased competition between conflicting 
parties and a lack of problem-solving, result in lower intentions to remain. As such, it should be 
considered equally important as perceived conflicts in that both have a significant, separate and unique 
impact on team members‟ morale.  
 
Distinguishing between perceived and actual conflicts could prove especially useful for those conflict 
studies which have been the subject of most debate, namely those focusing on its effect on performance-
related outcomes. Considering both concepts quite clearly capture different aspects of the conflict process, 
both could also have a differential impact on task performance and innovation (see, for instance, Mannes, 
2008). The lack of conformity in the definition, conceptualization and measurement of conflict may hence 
have proven to be the perfect breeding ground for the mixed findings that conflict studies have produced 
over the past few years. Theories advocating a positive or curvilinear function for task conflict on 
performance for instance generally base this on a conceptualization of conflict as objective differences in 
interests and opinions, not perceived ones (Mannes, 2008). Regardless, not all empirical research has 
measured task conflict accordingly. Although all under the label of “task conflict”, most empirical 
evidence in support of a positive effect is found in laboratory or experimental studies measuring objective 
differences, while most negative evidence is based on field research measuring perceptions (Mannes, 
2008). In other words, previous studies that found task conflicts to negatively impact team performance 
might also have „suffered‟ from measuring task conflicts as perceived instead of actual incompatibilities.  
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Incorporating both objective and subjective differences of opinion into future research should thus allow 
us to gain a better insight into the complex relationship between conflict and team effectiveness.  
 
Third, this study also contributes to the conflict literature by shedding more light on how perceived 
conflict impacts intent to remain. Regardless the type, perceived conflict is traditionally hypothesized to 
negatively affect morale-related outcomes, with relationship conflicts generally having the strongest effect 
(Jehn and Bendersky, 2003). The results of this study are therefore surprising in that one would expect 
either both relationship and task conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs to have a negative 
effect or just relationship conflicts. This paper though provides support for perceived task conflict‟s 
negative effect on intent to remain, due to associated feelings of stress, tension and discomfort, but not so 
for perceived relationship conflict. Considering the „traditional‟ hypothesized effects do hold when 
running a model for the angel investors‟ and entrepreneurs‟ individual-level satisfaction (i.e. a significant, 
negative effect for perceived relationship conflict and an insignificant effect for perceived task conflict), it 
would seem as though these surprising results are not so much due to the specific conflict dynamics in this 
setting, but rather to the specifics of the outcome under study. More specifically, whereas traditional 
conflict literature has labeled both intention to remain and satisfaction as morale-related or affective 
outcomes, it seems as though – in this particular setting - this label is only justified for the angel investors‟ 
and entrepreneurs‟ satisfaction. Deciding whether or not to remain with their ventures on the other hand 
seems to be more of a business decision, which would also be corroborated by the effect of actual goal 
incompatibilities and perceived performance. In other words, depending on how high the stakes are for the 
individuals involved, some otherwise affective-driven outcomes might have a more pronounced business 
element to them.  
 
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on the relationship between external investors and 
entrepreneurs, which has generally focused on either one side of the equation, i.e. either the investors or 
the entrepreneurs (e.g. Higashide and Birley, 2002; Parhankangas and Landström, 2006). By gathering 
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quantitative data from both angel investors and entrepreneurs within the same company, this paper can 
thus provide a more comprehensive view on their conflicts, interactions and relationship in general.  
 
4.7 Limitations, future research and implications 
 
This study is not without its limitations. First, all data were self-report data, which might give raise to 
concerns regarding common method variance. However, I believe that the several precautions taken in the 
design of the questionnaire, statistical tests conducted afterwards, the fact that there were several 
insignificant correlations in the study as well as the different resulting models for satisfaction and intent to 
remain all increase the probability that the results were not distorted. Second, considering the data were 
cross-sectional, caution is advised in drawing causal inferences. Some might argue that low intentions to 
remain, regardless the underlying motivation, could distort respondents‟ perceptions of conflict. In other 
words, as some kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, entrepreneurs and investors could make themselves think 
there is a lot of conflict because they want to leave and as such justify this decision or motivation to 
themselves. Although I cannot completely rule it out, I do believe its impact should be limited given the 
firm theory used to formulate hypotheses. Furthermore, reverse causality could not provide an adequate 
explanation for the results on actual conflict. Third, data were collected in two geographic locations 
(California and Belgium) and pooled based on the results from the multigroup CFA. An argument could 
be made that differences in degree of development of their respective risk capital markets could have an 
impact on the degree of professionalization of investors and entrepreneurs and hence on the intragroup 
dynamics that are at play in this relationship. Although the USA and Western-European countries are both 
known to have rather individualistic cultures, it would be interesting to see whether there are cross-
cultural differences in conflict‟s impact in the angel investor-entrepreneur relationship. This was however 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Based on the results and limitations of the study, there are several avenues for future research. First, in 
order to build further support of the importance of distinguishing between perceived and actual conflicts, 
it would be interesting to see how actual conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs impact their 
performance, creativity and innovativeness. Second, considering the focus on conflict, this paper only 
serves as a first step to gather more insights into the underlying motivations and reasons as to when and 
why investors and entrepreneurs decide to exit their business. Considering the importance of this topic 
though, it definitely warrants further research. Third, it would also be valuable to extend this study by 
gathering follow-up actual turnover data. Not only would this help to relieve concerns regarding self-
report data and reverse causality, it would also serve to see whether entrepreneur and investor intentions 
serve as a good proxy for their actual behaviour (Leroy et al., 2007). Fourth, angel investors and venture 
capitalists not only have many similarities, but also many differences. Therefore it would be interesting to 
see to what extent the findings of this study apply to the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship. 
Furthermore, as, to my knowledge, this represents the first study looking into actual conflict‟s impact on 
individual-level outcomes, it would also be interesting to see to what extent these findings could be 
generalized to other, more traditional teams.  
  
Finally, this paper also has several practical implications. First, these findings suggest that both 
entrepreneurs and angel investors should pay careful attention to conflicts that might arise between them. 
Although personal criticisms will affect both parties‟ satisfaction, it will not necessarily affect their 
intention to remain. More important in this regard is when the objectives, both actual and perceived, of the 
angel investors and entrepreneurs diverge too much as this might result in the exit of one or both parties, 
which, if prematurely, is less than desirable for both. Hence, this paper suggests that careful goal 
alignment between entrepreneurs and angel investors should be a top priority from the very start of their 
partnership, i.e. even in their selection process of the optimal entrepreneur/investor. Having highly aligned 
goals from the very start will substantially increase the chances of a subsequent cooperative and 
harmonious relationship between these two parties.   
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4.9 Appendices 
 
Appendix A:  
Table 4.3 Descriptives for Belgian and Californian teams in the sample 
 
Variables Belgium California 
Team size 3.46 3.77 
Age company 5.36 3.38 
Early stage investment** 0.57 0.88 
Age respondent** 44.35 49.29 
Education respondent (No. years) 6.13 6.87 
Entrepreneurial experience respondent (No. years) 8.54 11.05 
  ** Mann-Whitney test, p < .01 
 
Appendix B: Items for task and relationship conflict 
 
1.Task conflict 
d. How many disagreements over different ideas have there been between the entrepreneurial 
team and the angel investor(s)? 
e. How many differences about the content of decisions have the angel investor(s) and the 
entrepreneurial team had to work through? 
f. How many differences of opinion have there been between the angel investor(s) and the 
entrepreneurial team? 
2. Relationship conflict 
d. How much tension has there been between the angel investor(s) and the entrepreneurial team 
during decisions? 
e. How much personal friction has there been between the angel investor(s) and the 
entrepreneurial team during decisions? 
f. How much anger has there been between the angel investor(s) and the entrepreneurial team? 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to provide an insight into the scope and impact of potential pre- and post-
investment problems between angel investors and entrepreneurs. Whereas the first paper of this 
dissertation focuses on the pre-investment relationship, the second and third paper focus on the post-
investment relationship. More specifically, building on a traditional economic theory of market failure, the 
first study verifies the existence of pre-investment information problems and evaluates the extent to which 
the creation of business angel networks provides a solution to these problems. In the other two papers, 
building on conflict theory, the impact of both perceived and actual conflicts between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs is studied on innovation and intentions to remain (invested) in the company.  
 
In this final chapter I will summarize and highlight the main findings of this dissertation. Furthermore, I 
will discuss the contributions, implications, limitations and avenues for future research.  
 
5.1 Main findings 
 
Academics, practitioners and policy-makers have all often claimed the angel financing market, despite its 
huge potential, to be an inefficient one (Sohl, 1999). Based on a market failure argument, caused by R&D 
externalities and information problems, governments from all over the world have therefore launched 
initiatives to stimulate this market (European Commission, 2003; Maula et al., 2007). One of those 
measures, aimed at reducing information problems by increasing the transparency of the market, is the 
public support and funding of business angel networks. These networks provide a communication channel 
between entrepreneurs and angel investors without giving up the anonymity of the latter (Harrison and 
Mason, 1996). However, conclusive evidence concerning the existence of a market failure is lacking and 
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so are evaluations of the effectiveness and efficiency of policies targeted towards angel investors (Maula 
and Murray, 2003; Jääskeläinen et al., 2006; Maula et al., 2007). Aiming to address this gap, the first 
study of this dissertation shows that information problems plague the angel financing market in that (1) 
prior to the time of angel investment and compared to similar non-angel-backed companies, companies 
that received angel financing had a lower probability of raising financing from other, traditional sources 
and (2) the only difference between companies that received angel financing through a business angel 
network and those that received it through another channel is that the entrepreneurs and angel investors of 
the former just had trouble in finding each other. Interviews corroborate these results and also indicate that 
business angel networks help reduce these problems. This all cannot be labeled as a market failure yet 
though as angel-backed companies are value-destroying in the short-term, but there are several indicators 
of future potential. Combined with their contribution to economic development and growth as well as 
indirect benefits resulting from business angel networks, government intervention in the angel financing 
market through public support of business angel networks thus seems to be justified.   
 
In addition to examining whether angel investors and entrepreneurs encounter problems prior to the actual 
investment, this dissertation also studies potential problems between these two parties after the investment 
has taken place. Despite the importance of cooperation between external investors and entrepreneurs 
(Cable and Shane, 1997), there is still a lack of insight into the darker side of their relationship or, in other 
words, what happens when cooperation fades and conflict appears (Higashide and Birley, 2002; 
Parhankangas and Landström, 2006; Yitshaki, 2008). As such, the second and third paper of this 
dissertation aim to provide an insight into how conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs affect 
both the company they belong to and the individuals involved.  
 
First, the results reveal that task conflicts, i.e. perceived disagreements or differences in opinion between 
angel investors and entrepreneurs about the task performed (Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Bezrukova and Jehn, 
2008), have a significant, negative impact on the portfolio company‟s innovation and on both parties‟ 
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intentions to remain (invested) in the company. This would support the argument that in cases of task-
related disagreements, the interaction between angel investors and entrepreneurs has a higher chance of 
turning into a competitive game or psychological warfare (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Amason, 
1996; Brewer and Miller, 1996; LaBianca et al., 1998). Information sharing between these two parties will 
become impeded by higher levels of distrust, use of politics and cognitive barriers (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988; Baba et al., 2004; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). A truly open, creative debate will become 
less likely (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007) and these disagreements will redirect both parties‟ attention 
away from maximizing the innovative potential of their company, hence resulting in lower levels of 
innovation (Walton, 1969; Lovelace et al., 2001). In addition, these conflicts will produce feelings of 
stress, frustration and discomfort, making both parties less satisfied (Jehn, 1995; Jehn and Bendersky, 
2003) and hence less inclined to remain with their ventures.  
 
Second, the findings also show that relationship conflicts, i.e. perceived interpersonal incompatibilities 
between angel investors and entrepreneurs (Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008), 
negatively impact the portfolio company‟s innovation – albeit with a smaller impact than task conflicts – 
but do not affect both parties‟ intentions to remain. Its impact on innovation could be explained by the 
feelings of cynicism, avoidance and anxiety it creates, which would interfere with both parties‟ ability to 
handle and process new or complex information, would decrease cooperation and absorb time and energy 
necessary for creative thinking (Jehn, 1995; Amason, 1996; Matsuo, 2006). An alternative explanation for 
this finding is that the use of competitive tactics and politics in task conflicts between angel investors and 
entrepreneurs trigger relationship conflicts between these two parties (Simons and Peterson, 2000; 
Mooney et al., 2007), hence relationship conflict acting as a mediator of task conflict‟s negative effect on 
innovation. The absence of a significant effect for relationship conflicts on intentions to remain could 
indicate that deciding whether or not to remain with their ventures is more of a business decision to angel 
investors and entrepreneurs than an emotional one.  
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Third, process conflicts, i.e. an awareness of controversies between angel investors and entrepreneurs 
about aspects of how task accomplishment will proceed (Jehn and Mannix, 2001; Bezrukova and Jehn, 
2008), are only investigated in relation to the portfolio company‟s innovation (due to data restrictions for 
the third paper). Its effect on innovation is not supported, which may be due to the specifics of this 
research setting. Namely, due to adverse selection and moral hazard risks, angel investors and 
entrepreneurs conduct severe pre-investment discussions concerning the specifics of their partnership, i.e. 
company valuation, ownership distribution, voting rights, resource allocation, role definitions etc. Hence 
many of the topics that could potentially lead to process conflicts could already have been discussed prior 
to or at the time of investment. If so, this could result in lower levels of and less variation in process 
conflict in this setting, which is corroborated by the data, hence making it harder to uncover a statistical 
effect. 
 
Fourth, in addition to examining the impact of overt conflict or perceived incompatibilities between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs, this dissertation sought to explore the impact of actual incompatibilities or 
conflict. More specifically, the second and third paper focus on a specific type of actual incompatibilities 
prevalent in the angel investor-entrepreneur relationship, i.e. actual goal incompatibilities. As task 
conflicts are defined as perceived disagreements between angel investors and entrepreneurs regarding 
strategic decisions to be taken, such as what short-term and long-term objectives to set for the company, 
actual goal incompatibilities could be considered as a type of actual task conflict. The results reveal a 
moderating effect when relating this type of actual conflict to innovation and a main effect when relating it 
to intentions to remain. More specifically, perceived conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs, 
regardless the type, have a much stronger negative effect on innovation in the presence of higher rather 
than lower levels of actual conflict. This would support the argument that the negative emotions, 
frustrations, competitive tactics and disabled information-sharing process resulting from perceived 
conflicts are intensified by actual conflicts due to the associated lack of cooperation and problem-solving, 
more frequent communication and reduced quality of the information exchanged between angel investors 
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and entrepreneurs (Deutsch, 1973; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Fisher, 1998; De Clercq and Sapienza, 
2006). Secondly, the findings also show a significant, negative main effect of actual conflicts between 
angel investors and entrepreneurs on their intentions to remain. This could be explained by the associated 
increased competition and lack of problem-solving decreasing the probability of creating a long-term, 
cooperative business partnership, hence making it less lucrative, useful or desirable to stay in this 
relationship (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, 1998; Tjosvold, 1998). As similar mechanisms underlie actual 
conflict‟s main and moderating effects of perceived conflict, one could expect both to appear in the 
innovation and intentions to remain-models. A curvilinear effect for actual incompatibilities on innovation 
could not be uncovered, but this could be due to the small sample size. A potential explanation for the lack 
of a moderating effect of actual conflict in the intentions to remain model could be the strength of 
perceived task conflict‟s main effect. The innovation paper would namely suggest that low levels of actual 
conflicts are most beneficial for relationship and process conflicts. In other words, as perceived task 
conflict‟s negative main effect on innovation is the strongest of all three, it could also be the hardest one to 
turn around. Hence, it might be that, similarly, perceived task conflict‟s effect on intention to remain is so 
strong that it cannot be turned around by low levels of actual conflict. 
 
5.2 Academic contributions 
 
The contributions of this dissertation to the literature are multiple. First, it contributes to the academic 
evaluation literature. Theories of government intervention are generally based on a market failure 
argument, which can be caused by information asymmetries, high levels of uncertainty, increasing scale 
economies, externalities or public goods (Dollery, 1994). The large number of government intervention 
proponents notwithstanding, a substantial literature stream has focused on refuting the market failure 
paradigm (e.g. Wolf, 1979; Le Grand, 1991).  More particularly, these critics argue that government 
initiatives do not always achieve their intended goal, due to government failure (Dollery, 1994). By 
providing an empirical test of the market failure argument, this dissertation provides more conclusive 
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evidence concerning its existence and as such provides support for theories favouring government 
intervention. 
 
Second, this research also contributes to the conflict literature in multiple ways. Firstly, it sheds more light 
on how conflict impacts intentions to remain. Conflict researchers generally make a distinction between 
two types of outcomes, i.e. performance- and morale-related ones (Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; De Dreu 
and Beersma, 2005). The first category entails outcomes such as innovation, creativity and task 
performance, the second one covers individual well-being, satisfaction and intentions to remain. It is 
generally assumed that perceived conflict‟s effects are similar for outcomes within the same category, but 
can differ across outcome categories (see Jehn and Bendersky, 2003 for a review). This research shows 
that this traditional view might not always be warranted. More particularly, in the setting of angel 
investors and entrepreneurs perceived conflict‟s effects on outcomes within the same category, i.e. 
satisfaction and intentions to remain, do differ. Whereas satisfaction appears to be affective-driven or 
morale-related, intentions to remain appear to be more business-driven, as also corroborated by actual 
conflict‟s effect on intentions to remain. The more pronounced business element in deciding whether or 
not to remain with their companies might be due to the voluntary nature of the relationship between angel 
investors and entrepreneurs as opposed to that of many work and student teams. Namely, while angel 
investors and entrepreneurs choose to work together, members of work and student teams are generally 
assigned to their teams by a supervisor. If angel investors and entrepreneurs cannot find a way to work 
together, there is no use in continuing their partnership. While emotional problems also impede a smooth 
cooperation, they do not completely block the process as both parties‟ stakes are too high. Problems 
immediately relating to the task at hand though, i.e. having different objectives, substantially decrease the 
chances of forging a cooperative partnership. Members of more traditional teams generally do not have 
the option of abandoning their teams if cooperation is failing, hence maybe making business motives less 
important than emotional ones. 
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Secondly, this research sheds more light on the conflict-innovation relationship. Whether task conflicts are 
beneficial or detrimental to a team‟s or company‟s innovation and performance has been the subject of 
much debate (Lovelace et al., 2001; De Dreu, 2006; Matsuo, 2006). Some researchers have even openly 
raised the question as to whether these conflicts can ever be valuable and should not be avoided altogether 
(Tjosvold, 2007; De Dreu, 2008). The research presented in this dissertation provides two potential 
explanations for the mixed, i.e. positive and negative, findings that task conflict studies have produced 
over the years. First, most conflict studies have focused on conflict within teams, but neglected to 
recognize that teams can consist of subgroups (Bezrukova and Jehn, 2008). The findings revealed in this 
dissertation show that researchers might want to take this into account as the existence of subgroups can 
add some specific dynamics to the conflict process, potentially altering its effects. More specifically, 
subgroups having task-related disagreements could heighten the chance of them turning into warring 
factions, playing a competitive game, which would result in task conflicts between them having a negative 
impact. In other words, previous studies that found task conflicts to negatively impact team performance 
might in fact have „suffered‟ from teams consisting of subgroups. An alternative explanation is the lack of 
conformity applied in the definition, conceptualization and measurement of conflict. Early conflict 
theorists defined conflict to include both perceived and actual incompatibilities (Pondy, 1967; Deutsch, 
1973). Conflict studies over the years have neglected this distinction though, hence potentially 
confounding its results. Theories advocating a positive or curvilinear function for task conflict generally 
base this on a conceptualization as objective differences in interests and opinions, not perceived ones 
(Mannes, 2008). Regardless, not all empirical research has measured task conflict accordingly. Although 
all under the label of “task conflict”, most empirical evidence in support of a positive effect is found in 
laboratory or experimental studies measuring objective differences, while most negative evidence is based 
on field research measuring perceptions (Mannes, 2008). In other words, previous studies that found task 
conflicts to negatively impact team performance might also have „suffered‟ from measuring task conflicts 
as perceived instead of actual incompatibilities – as would be supported by this dissertation. As such, this 
dissertation thus provides two alternative explanations for conflict literature‟s mixed results regarding task 
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conflict‟s effect on team performance. The two views provided are interrelated as actual goal 
incompatibilities could be a source of subgroup formation (Lau and Murnigham, 1998). However, these 
incompatibilities do not necessarily lead to the creation of subgroups as other intrateam differences might 
neutralize their effect on subgroup formation (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). Similarly, even in cases of 
perfect goal congruence, these same other intrateam differences can still lead to subgroup formation. 
 
Thirdly, this research contributes to the entrepreneurship literature in three ways. First, although 
cooperation is often mentioned as a key ingredient to a successful relationship between external investors 
and entrepreneurs, there is a lack of research looking into what happens if cooperation is missing (Cable 
and Shane, 1997; Parhankangas and Landström, 2006). This dissertation addresses this gap by showing 
that conflicts between angel investors and entrepreneurs can be detrimental both to the company‟s 
performance and to the individuals involved. As such, conflicts between these two parties should not be 
ignored. Second, little to none is known about what factors drive investors‟ and entrepreneurs‟ intentions 
and motivations to voluntarily remain with their businesses (DeTienne, 2008; Wincent et al., 2008). 
Applying a socio-psychological perspective, this research is among the first to shed some light on the 
antecedents of one of the most crucial phases of the partnership between investors and entrepreneurs, i.e. 
exit. Thirdly, two papers also provide a test for assumptions key to the entrepreneurial finance literature. 
Whereas the first paper reveals evidence for the inefficiency of the angel financing market, the third paper 
reveals evidence for entrepreneurs wanting to outstay their angel investors.  
 
Finally, the papers in this dissertation also provide multiple methodological contributions. So far, studies 
evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of government programmes relied on either qualitative or 
quantitative data (e.g. Murray, 1998; Maula and Murray, 2003). In this dissertation though, both 
approaches are combined allowing a richer and more rigorous analysis of the government measure of 
interest, i.e. the public funding and support of business angel networks. Second, by applying a multilevel 
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approach in the third paper, this research contributes to conflict and entrepreneurship research as both 
have suffered from a lack of multilevel studies (Ireland et al., 2005; De Dreu and Gelfand, 2007). Third, 
the team approach adopted in the final two papers of this dissertation required gathering data from both 
entrepreneurs and angel investors. As such it also contributes to the entrepreneurial finance literature, 
which has generally focused on the perceptions of only investors (e.g. Higashide and Birley, 2002; De 
Clercq and Sapienza, 2006) or entrepreneurs (e.g. Ehrlich et al., 1994; Saetre, 2003).    
 
5.3 Practical implications 
 
The findings presented in the three studies also have several practical implications for entrepreneurs, angel 
investors and policy-makers.  
 
First, even today, business angel networks have a reputation of attracting the worst-quality deals, i.e. the 
most risky companies unable to secure financing elsewhere. As such, entrepreneurs in search of seed or 
start-up money often fear contacting a business angel network, as do angel investors in search of valuable 
investment opportunities. The results in this study show though that this reputation is more of a myth than 
it is reality as companies seeking angel financing through a network are not worse nor better than those 
seeking it through another channel. Hence business angel networks can represent a helpful resource to 
both entrepreneurs and angel investors.  
 
Second, the relationship between angel investors and entrepreneurs is sometimes compared to a marriage. 
Both parties make a commitment with the best intentions (hopefully), a commitment which requires 
mutual trust. Some live happily ever after, others end prematurely. Similar to a marriage, it is therefore not 
odd that investors and entrepreneurs occasionally face conflicts and disagreements. What people however 
sometimes tend to forget is that these conflicts can have far-stretching effects. Not only will the people 
involved suffer from these conflicts, they may also affect the performance of the company involved. The 
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most potentially detrimental types of conflicts in this regard are those relating to strategic decisions to be 
taken. Angel investors and entrepreneurs perceiving the other party to have a different opinion or other 
objectives could lead to psychological warfare, distrust, consume their time and energy and create 
frustrations and tension. Not only could this adversely affect their combined creativity and innovativeness, 
it could also make both parties want to leave their ventures more rapidly. This is not to say that conflict 
between angel investors and entrepreneurs can never be constructive, quite the contrary. More 
specifically, through careful goal alignment angel investors and entrepreneurs can substantially increase 
the chances of creating a harmonious, cooperative relationship and value can be created out of conflict. If, 
on the other hand, actual goals of angel investors and entrepreneurs diverge too much, this could result in 
an exit of either one or both, which, if prematurely, is less than desirable for both. Secondly, it could also 
worsen the already negative effects of conflict on the company‟s innovation. Open and honest 
communication about personal objectives from the very start is thus of crucial importance to this 
partnership. 
 
Third, angel investors are often considered the less professional and less formal counterparts of venture 
capitalists. This may lead some entrepreneurs to mistakenly assume that angel money is easy money in 
that, once they have received the money, they do not have to take the angel investors into account. This 
research adds to the empirical evidence that would warn entrepreneurs against making this assumption all 
too quickly. More particularly, on average and much alike venture capitalists, angel investors want to exit 
from their ventures more rapidly than the entrepreneurs. This would confirm that angel investors are not 
purely driven by altruistic motives to invest, as they see exit from the business as an important harvesting 
opportunity. In other words, entrepreneurs should keep in mind that, on average, angel investors do not 
just invest for fun and will want something in return (financially). 
 
Finally, this research provides support for policy-makers creating measures to stimulate the angel 
financing market. Angel-backed companies contribute to local economic development and growth, but 
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angel investors and entrepreneurs sometimes have trouble in finding each other. As business angel 
networks help reduce these problems, public funding and support of those networks is vital. In addition, 
policy-makers should also take the results of this research as an incentive to create other measures to help 
raise the awareness of the array of financing sources available to entrepreneurs, as still too many of them 
have no idea what potential sources are out there. 
 
5.4 Limitations and avenues for future research 
 
This final section sets out to discuss the main limitations of this doctoral research and suggest some 
avenues for further research. 
 
A first limitation of this research relates to the theoretical perspectives used. Whereas the first paper 
applies insights from the economic theory of market failure, the final two papers adopt a conflict theory 
lens. A theory of market failure is based on the premises that when markets fail, governments should 
intervene. Hence, an assumption implicit to this theory is that whenever governments should intervene, 
they can. It is exactly this assumption that scholars opposing any form of government intervention have 
used to formulate their theory of government failure. For example, the capture theory of government 
intervention states that governments are not able to achieve the targeted results, because of the 
interference of interest groups seeking to maximize their own wealth (Dollery, 1994). Although this 
limitation of the theory of market failure is not explicitly incorporated in the first study of this dissertation, 
it is addressed indirectly by examining whether or not BAN subsidization helped in contributing to 
economic development and in reducing information and resulting financing problems of entrepreneurial 
companies. Conflict theory on the other hand assumes that conflict is a process that starts with the 
experience or awareness of incompatibilities (Korsgaard et al., 2008). Even though most of these scholars 
recognize that perception or interpretation of conflict does not necessarily correspond with actual or 
objective events, conflict studies over the years have come to exclusively focus on the perceptual side of 
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the conflict story. This dissertation shows that excluding the actual incompatibilities that might (but not 
necessarily) underlie the perceived ones is a limitation of this theory as both have a unique role to play in 
the conflict process.  
 
Secondly, there are several limitations in terms of the variables used in this dissertation. In the first paper 
value creation by angel-backed companies was measured through return on assets. Ideally this would have 
been compared to the companies‟ funding cost, however these data are unavailable for unquoted 
companies (which most angel-backed companies are). A similar measure for sales would have been 
preferable, but as small Belgian companies are not obliged to provide these data when filing their financial 
accounts this measure could not be constructed. Therefore, as an alternative, a measure for value added 
rescaled by total assets was created. In the second paper, innovation was measured by the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets. Although this variable is generally considered a good proxy for innovative 
activity, it has to be acknowledged that it is likely to be more a reliable measure of innovation for 
companies operating in high-technology industries. To counteract this potential bias another measure was 
therefore integrated in the study, corresponding with a broader, more general conceptualization of 
innovation (incorporating for instance the company‟s adaptability to changes). We argue that both 
measures together provide us with a rather comprehensive view of the level of innovation in these 
companies. The outcome measure used in the third paper, intention to remain, could be critiqued for 
implicitly assuming that whenever angel investors and entrepreneurs want to remain with or leave their 
ventures, they can. However, this might not always be the case as, for instance, poorly performing 
entrepreneurs might be replaced by their external investors or external investors in highly performing 
ventures might always to exit as quickly as possible. In order to limit this bias, wording was somewhat 
altered to emphasize the voluntary aspect of the question and perceived performance was taken into 
account. In addition, confirming construct validity, data gathered on the Belgian companies revealed 
intention to remain to be significantly and positively related to turnover. Further, actual conflict was 
measured as the difference between the goal importance rankings of angel investors and entrepreneurs 
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based on Sapienza and Gupta (1994). As such, it represents an amalgam of potential goal differences, 
including financial goals such as sales growth, cash flow and return on investment, but also non-financial 
goals such as new product development, operating efficiency and personnel development. Although 
measuring goal incompatibility this way allows us to provide a broad overview of its potential role in the 
relationship between angel investors and entrepreneurs, it also suffers from problems such as conceptual 
ambiguity, discarded information and insensitivity to the sources of goal differences (Edwards, 1993; 
2001). Therefore, for future research, it would be interesting to run polynomial regressions per goal which 
should allow us to get an insight into (1) which goals are the most important ones as drivers of 
effectiveness, both in terms of the portfolio company‟s performance as well as the individuals‟, i.e. angel 
investors‟ and entrepreneurs‟, attitudes (Hackman, 1987) and (2) per goal, whether exact correspondence 
between entrepreneurs‟ and investors‟ ratings always results in higher effectiveness or whether it is either 
the entrepreneurs‟ ór the investors‟ ratings that have the predominant impact.  
   
A third limitation of this research relates to the internal validity of the studies, due to different geographic 
locations used for data collection. Whereas the first two studies are based on Belgian data, the third study 
uses both Belgian and US (California) data. In cases of all-Belgian data, internal validity should be 
increased due to the fact that all angel-backed companies operate within the same economic, legislative, 
fiscal and cultural environment. When Belgian data are combined with those collected in California 
though, one might argue that the proposed relationships could somewhat differ depending on the location 
of data collection. More specifically, the angel financing market –as the risk capital market in general – is 
more developed in the USA compared to Continental Europe (EBAN, 2005). This might have an impact 
on the degree of professionalization of the investors and hence how they manage their investments in 
general and their relationships with entrepreneurs in particular. Furthermore, although the USA and 
Western European countries are both known to have rather individualistic cultures, slight differences in 
culture might also affect intragroup dynamics (e.g. Xie et al., 1998; Oetzel and Ting-Toomey, 2003). In 
this particular research, data would suggest the risk of damaged internal validity being limited though as 
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there are no significant differences between Californian and Belgian teams in terms of the level of 
perceived conflict (both task and relationship conflict) as well as the individuals‟ average intentions to 
remain in the company. The only difference is that Belgian teams have better aligned goals than 
Californian ones. As the correlation between goal incompatibility and intention to remain is negative and 
significant in both samples, I however believe that the effect of this difference should be small.  
 
Fourthly, there are two threats to external validity, one relating to the limited geographical data coverage 
and one relating to the teams used for this research. First, one might argue that there is limited 
generalizability for papers using only Belgian data. However, I argue that external validity should be 
warranted as Belgium is rather similar to other European countries in terms of socio-economic indicators, 
its business angel networks and its fiscal treatment of angel investments (Stroobandt et al., 2005; EBAN, 
2005). Hence the findings presented here could have relevant implications for other European countries. 
Furthermore, whereas angel financing literature is mainly based on US studies, the conflict literature is 
evenly spread over the US and Western Europe. As these studies have generally produced similar results, 
external validity should be warranted. A second threat to external validity relates to the type of teams 
investigated. Conflict studies so far have generally either focused on top management teams, student 
teams or work teams (Jehn, 1995; Amason, 1996; Jehn and Mannix, 2001). As angel investors and 
entrepreneurs enter their teams under a different status, one might not immediately be inclined to think of 
these groups as teams and hence question the generalizability of the results to more traditional teams. 
However, just like any other team, angel investors and entrepreneurs are also dependent on each other to 
reach a common, overarching goal hence making the conclusions of this research also valuable for these 
other teams. I do acknowledge though that, considering the focus of the research is on angel investors and 
entrepreneurs that are actively involved in strategic decision making, results are probably most relevant 
for teams executing similar, complex tasks, such as top management teams (Srivastava et al., 2006). The 
question then also arises how the results of this dissertation would translate to that other important group 
of external investors, namely venture capitalists. Much alike angel investors, venture capitalists and 
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entrepreneurs are also dependent on each other in fulfilling their roles to reach a common goal and could 
thus also be thought of as forming a team (Wijbenga and van Witteloostuijn, 2006). The relationship 
between both types of external risk capital investors and their entrepreneurs further presents many 
similarities in terms of potential conflict antecedents. For instance, in both cases there is some competition 
over scarce resources (whether it be money or power), communication is of huge importance and personal 
differences are something to be avoided rather than sought out. That being said though, there are some 
differences between these two groups that could alter the conflict dynamics at play in the relationship with 
their entrepreneurs. One could argue that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are somewhat less 
dependent on each other than angel investors and their entrepreneurs are. This as venture capitalists are 
more concerned with market risk than they are with agency risk, making them rely more on pre-
investment due diligence and contracting rather than post-investment monitoring (Fiet, 1995; Van 
Osnabrugge, 2000). Hence, both parties‟ roles will have been clearly outlined prior to investment, hence 
making them having to rely less on each other in order to complete these roles successfully. These lower 
levels of interdependency could in turn result in a reduced probability of perceived conflict presenting 
itself between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. However, our data would also indicate that actual 
conflicts between these two parties (as actual goal incompatibilities) are higher than they are between 
angel investors and entrepreneurs. In other words, the chance of conflict between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs presenting itself might be lower compared to the angel investor situation, but if it does 
present itself it might be stronger. This could result in somewhat more extreme situations, with venture 
capitalist-entrepreneur pairs either being very happy together or very disgruntled. So, although, on 
average, the results presented in this dissertation could be similar for venture capitalists, there could be a 
more varied picture behind those averages. 
 
Finally, the majority of the data gathered for this research are collected through surveys or interviews, 
which could increase the risk of several biases. In order to account for recollection bias and to provide an 
objective test of the subjective views gathered through the interviews, data in the first study were therefore 
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complemented with quantitative data based on the companies‟ financial accounts. This measure was also 
taken in the second paper, which also reduced the risk of common method variance problems. 
Furthermore, special care was taken in the sample selection as to further minimize recall and survival bias 
(as was done for the third paper). Although quantitative data could not be gathered for the third paper, 
precautions taken in designing the questionnaire and statistical tests conducted afterwards suggest that the 
risk of common method variance inflating the results is limited.  
 
As time and space is limited in the process of writing a doctoral dissertation, several other issues are left 
for future research. First, in order to make a more robust conclusion concerning the existence of a failure 
in the angel financing market, additional data could be collected over a longer time frame, such as five to 
ten years after investment, in which to assess the value creation of angel-backed companies (Lerner, 
1999). Second, it would be interesting to see whether a larger sample would allow uncovering a 
curvilinear effect of actual conflicts on performance and innovation. Other potential topics could include 
studying other types of actual conflict (i.e. other forms of actual incompatibilities instead of merely 
focusing on actual goal incompatibilities), the effect of actual conflicts on other outcomes besides 
innovation and intentions to remain and extending this research to other teams. Third, further research is 
warranted on the impact of intersubgroup dynamics on the conflict process. Future research could for 
instance study to what extent predictions made in this dissertation would hold for subgroups based on 
other differences than goals. Fifth, research on what drives the exit of entrepreneurs and investors is just 
beginning to arise (DeTienne, 2008). Although the third paper in this dissertation addresses this gap, much 
remains to be learned about what triggers actual exit. A potentially interesting research question could be 
under what conditions positive incentives for exit (such as a window of opportunity for an IPO) outweigh 
negative incentives (such as personal frustrations). Gathering additional turnover data would also help to 
reduce the threat of common method variance in the current study as well as make causal inferences more 
robust. Finally, considering angel investors share many similarities to, but also differ substantially from 
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venture capitalists, it would be interesting to see to what extent findings from this study could be extended 
to the venture capital setting. 
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Summary in Dutch (Nederlandstalige samenvatting) 
 
Google, Amazon.com, Twitter, Starbucks, Skype...allen bekende voorbeelden van ondernemingen die 
financiering ontvangen hebben van business angels. Dit zijn individuen die een deel van hun persoonlijk 
vermogen investeren in niet-beursgenoteerde ondernemingen zonder een voorafgaande connectie met de 
ondernemer(s) (zoals familie of vrienden) en dit in ruil voor aandelen. Hoewel gegevens over Europese 
business angels zeldzaam zijn, zouden er volgens een recente schatting ongeveer 75 000 business angels 
zijn die jaarlijks samen 3 miljard EUR investeren. De relatie tussen deze investeerders en ondernemers 
kan zich uitstrekken over een periode van vijf tot zeven jaar. Niettegenstaande deze lange termijn weten 
we tot op heden nog vrij weinig over hoe deze partijen met elkaar interageren. Daarom bestuderen we in 
dit doctoraal proefschrift de omvang en impact van problemen die business angels en ondernemers kunnen 
ervaren, zowel voor het tijdstip van investering als erna. 
 
De eerste studie van dit doctoraat bevestigt het bestaan van substantiële informatieproblemen in de markt 
voor business angel financiering. Ten eerste, ervaren business angels en ondernemers dikwijls problemen 
om elkaar te vinden, hetzij door de business angels‟ drang naar anonimiteit of een gebrekkige kennis van 
financieringsopties vanwege de ondernemers. Ten tweede, blijken business angels net die ondernemingen 
te financieren die traditioneel het minst kans maken op het verkrijgen van „klassieke‟ financiering (zoals 
bankfinanciering). Dit is te wijten aan hun gebrek aan persoonlijke en zakelijke zekerheden wat een hoog 
risico met zich meebrengt voor potentiële investeerders. Teneinde deze problemen te reduceren werden 
business angel netwerken in het leven geroepen, die als communicatiekanaal dienen tussen kandidaat-
investeerders en ondernemers. Een belangrijke bevinding van dit onderzoek is dat ondernemingen die 
financiering verkrijgen via deze netwerken niet slechter noch beter presteren dan ondernemingen die angel 
financiering verkrijgen op een andere manier. Met andere woorden, ze trekken niet – zoals vaak beweerd 
wordt – de slechtste deals aan en vormen aldus een handig en nuttig hulpmiddel voor zowel ondernemers 
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op zoek naar financiering als business angels op zoek naar investeringsopportuniteiten. Verder bevestigt 
deze studie de waarde van overheidsinterventie voor ondernemerschap in België. De business angel-
gesteunde ondernemingen dragen immers bij tot de lokale economische ontwikkeling en groei, maar 
worden – zonder hulp – geconfronteerd met informatie- en financieringsproblemen. Aangezien uit dit 
onderzoek blijkt dat business angel netwerken deze problemen helpen te reduceren, maar zij niet op 
zelfstandige basis kunnen overleven, is overheidssteun voor dit soort organisaties dus cruciaal en goed 
besteed. 
 
In de tweede en derde studie wordt de aandacht vervolgens verschoven naar de post-investeringsrelatie 
tussen business angels en ondernemers. Beide studies tonen aan dat conflicten tussen business angels en 
ondernemers een invloed hebben op zowel het bedrijf waartoe ze behoren als op de attitudes van de 
betrokken individuen. Meer specifiek blijkt uit dit onderzoek dat gepercipieerde conflicten over 
strategische beslissingen (vb. welke producten te ontwikkelen, welke markten te betreden of welke 
groeistrategie te volgen) een sterk negatieve impact hebben op de innovatie van de betrokken 
ondernemingen én op de intenties van zowel ondernemers als investeerders om bij het bedrijf te blijven. 
De eerder persoonlijke, gevoelsmatige discussies tussen beide partijen hebben enkel een negatief effect op 
de innovatie van de portefeuillebedrijven, maar niet op hun individuele attitudes. Dit laatste zou erop 
kunnen wijzen dat de beslissing om al dan niet bij hun onderneming te blijven eerder een zakelijke dan 
wel emotionele beslissing is voor business angels en ondernemers. Conflicten aangaande taakverdeling of 
toewijzing van middelen blijken dan weer geen effect te hebben op innovatie. Bovenop het onderzoeken 
van gepercipieerde conflicten, gingen we ook de invloed na van „echte‟ conflicten. Conflicten worden 
doorgaans gedefinieerd als gepercipieerde onverenigbaarheden tussen individuen. Perceptie stemt echter 
niet noodzakelijk overeen met realiteit. De tweede en derde studie van dit doctoraat tonen aan dat de twee 
componenten belangrijk zijn in een conflictdefinitie aangezien ze beiden een unieke en significante 
invloed hebben op het conflictproces. We focussen hierbij specifiek op onverenigbaarheden in 
doelstellingen tussen business angels en ondernemers. Uit de tweede studie van dit doctoraat blijkt dat het 
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negatief effect van gepercipieerde conflicten op innovatie veel sterker is indien de doelstellingen tussen 
beide partijen sterk uiteen liggen. Omgekeerd blijkt echter ook dat indien business angels en ondernemers 
erin slagen hun doelstellingen zorgvuldig op mekaar af te stellen dit een atmosfeer kan creëren 
waarbinnen discussies en debatten wél resulteren in meer innovatie. In de derde studie bevestigen we dat 
grote onverenigbaarheden in doelstellingen tussen business angels en ondernemers verder kunnen 
uitmonden in de vroegtijdige exit van beide partijen (of één ervan). Open en eerlijke communicatie tussen 
business angels en ondernemers over persoonlijke doelstellingen van bij de start van hun relatie is dus van 
cruciaal belang.  
 
